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In February 1994, a mobile home company, Steenberg 
Homes, arranged to deliver a mobile home to a customer in 
Manitowoc County, Wisconsin.1 The easiest way to deliver the 
home was to cut across the neighbors’ property.2 The neighbors 
who owned the property, Harvey and Lois Jacque, however, 
had made it clear to the company that they would not give the 
company permission to cross their land.3 The Jacques were 
sensitive about letting others use their land because they had 
lost property valued at over $10,000 to other neighbors in an 
adverse possession action in the mid-1980s.4 Despite the Jac-
ques’ express denial of permission, the company deliberately 
crossed the Jacques’ land to deliver the home. The Jacques 
sued the company for trespass, seeking compensatory and pu-
nitive damages.5 A jury ultimately awarded the Jacques $1 in 
nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.6 
In Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., a federal 
jury in Georgia awarded twenty-three landowners of sixteen 
different properties $47,000 in compensatory damages and $45 
million in punitive damages.7 The defendant in the case, Com-
bustion Engineering, operated a mine that polluted streams 
running through the plaintiffs’ properties.8 For several years 
the defendant failed to prevent acidic water emanating from its 
property from entering the streams.9 The trial court reduced 
the punitive damages award first to $15 million and then, after 
 
 1. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997). 
 2. Id. (“Steenberg determined that the easiest route to deliver the mobile 
home was across the Jacques’ land.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 158. 
 7. No. CIV. A. CV 191-178, 1997 WL 423108, at *4 (S.D. Ga. June 9, 
1997), vacated in part, 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 8. Id. at *2–3 (describing the “most egregious” conduct as the failure of 
Combustion Engineering to do more to prevent the acidic water problem). 
 9. Id. at *2–3; see also Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 
1320, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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appeal and remand, to $4.35 million.10 The Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the reduced punitive damages 
award.11 
At first glance, these two cases do not appear to have much 
in common. The Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., case was a 
dispute between a small company and individual landowners 
over the ability of the landowners to exclude others from their 
property.12 The damages were nominal and the punitive dam-
ages were fairly modest for an award against a corporate de-
fendant.13 The conflict affected virtually no one other than the 
litigants. By contrast, the Johansen case involved a dispute be-
tween a large mining company and twenty-three landowners of 
sixteen different properties.14 Although this was a private civil 
suit, the defendant’s actions caused damage not only to the 
plaintiffs themselves but also to public natural resources (the 
streams).15 Further, the punitive damages award was substan-
tial, even after the court’s reduction.16 
Despite these differences, the two cases are similar in 
many ways. First, the harm to the plaintiffs comprised only a 
portion of the defendant’s total wrongdoing sought to be pu-
nished through punitive damages. In both cases, the defendant 
caused harm that went uncompensated in the civil action. In 
Jacque, the damages awarded did not compensate for the viola-
tion of the plaintiffs’ right to exclude others from their proper-
ty, nor did they vindicate society’s interest in protecting that 
right; such harm was never translated into monetary terms. 
Similarly, in Johansen, there was no valuation of damage to 
the streams or to the public’s right in those resources. The 
plaintiffs’ compensation was limited to diminution in value of 
their private properties, which resulted in most of the plaintiffs 
receiving only $3000 in compensatory damages.17 
Second, both cases were litigated in the shadow of the Su-
preme Court’s efforts to place constitutional due process limits 
on punitive damages, efforts which began in earnest with its 
 
 10. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1327. 
 11. Id. at 1339. 
 12. 563 N.W.2d 154, 156–58 (Wis. 1997). 
 13. See id. at 156. 
 14. Johansen, 1997 WL 423108, at *1. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1340 (upholding a punitive damages award 
of $4.35 million). 
 17. Johansen, 1997 WL 423108, at *4. 
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1996 decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.18 In 
BMW, the Supreme Court for the first time placed substantive 
due process limits on punitive damages awards in civil cases.19 
The Court also set forth three “guideposts” for assessing the 
constitutionality of such damages awards: (1) the degree of rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio between 
the punitive damages awarded and the actual or potential 
harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) the difference between 
the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penal-
ties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.20 
In 2003, the Court went further and warned that few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensato-
ry damages would satisfy due process.21 The Court, relying on 
BMW, stated, however, that awards exceeding a single-digit ra-
tio “may” comport with due process if an egregious act results 
in only a small amount of economic damages, if the injury is 
hard to detect, or if the monetary value of noneconomic harm is 
difficult to determine.22 The Court reasoned that the presump-
tive ratio would ensure that “the measure of punishment is 
both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to 
the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”23 
This Article proposes that, in applying the constitutionally 
based single-digit ratio presumption, courts must be attentive 
to unvalued harm. Where courts ignore this unvalued harm, it 
can result in a mechanical and inappropriate reduction of puni-
tive damages awards on due process grounds. Both the inten-
tional trespass claim in Jacque and the environmental harm 
claim in Johansen meet the Supreme Court’s standard for de-
parture from a single-digit ratio: in both cases, there is a strong 
argument that either the defendant’s conduct resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages (nominal damages in Jac-
que) or that the monetary value of noneconomic harm is diffi-
cult to determine (harm to the streams in Johansen).24 
 
 18. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 19. Id. at 585. 
 20. Id. at 575. 
 21. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 426. 
 24. See id. at 425 (noting that damages may comport with due process 
where an egregious act results in a small amount of economic damages or 
where noneconomic harm might be difficult to determine). 
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Although both types of cases present circumstances justify-
ing departure from the ratio presumption, a close review of the 
intentional tort and environmental harm cases decided since 
BMW show that courts have often applied the ratio require-
ment very differently in the two types of cases. In the inten-
tional tort cases with small or nominal damages, like Jacque, 
as well as in cases involving defamation and civil rights viola-
tions, lower courts more freely disregard single-digit ratios.25 
Courts reason that, because compensatory damages in these 
cases are often nominal or very small, higher ratios are needed 
to deter and punish reprehensible conduct that results in harm 
to the plaintiff beyond any monetary loss.26 In all of these in-
tentional tort cases, the plaintiff ’s rights are violated, but no 
valuation of that violation occurs in assessing compensatory 
damages.27 
Just as damages awards in the intentional tort cases con-
tain no valuation of the interference with person or property, 
harm to natural resources also constitutes harm that is difficult 
to measure easily in monetary terms. More often, however, 
courts in environmental harm cases brought by private parties 
fail to recognize that compensatory damages do not measure a 
large portion of environmental harm. This failure results be-
cause in private party environmental harm cases, the compen-
satory damages frequently are limited to cleanup costs or dimi-
nution in value to property, and there is no named plaintiff 
with standing to obtain compensation for damage to “public” 
natural resources or ecosystems.28 As a result, compensatory 
 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
 27. See infra Part III.A. 
 28. See M. STUART MADDEN & GERALD W. BOSTON, LAW OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 66–68 (3d ed. 2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 821C (1979)) (stating that the law has been slow to recognize the 
right of private persons to bring actions for public nuisance to recover for envi-
ronmental harm without a showing of “special injury” because, in part, the 
theory remains that only sovereigns should maintain actions for public harm); 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 74–75 (5th ed. 
2006) (discussing the limitations of private nuisance claims brought to recover 
for environmental harms, noting that class actions have “not played a signifi-
cant role in redressing environmental damage,” and concluding that even 
when the aggregate damage is significant, the damage to individual victims 
“may be insufficient to make a lawsuit worthwhile”); see also infra Part III.C 
(exploring the standing and valuation difficulties in environmental harm cas-
es). 
KLASS_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:36 AM 
88 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:83 
 
damages in such cases do not adequately reflect the actual 
harm or damage to natural resources. 
Unlike in the intentional tort cases, many courts deciding 
private party environmental harm cases mechanically reduce 
the jury’s punitive damages award to reach a single-digit ra-
tio.29 In doing so, courts fail to recognize the nonmonetary 
harm to the environment that was not included in the compen-
satory damages award. This Article argues that lower courts 
should more fully address those circumstances where the judi-
cial system fails to monetarily account for certain types of 
harm, whether the harm occurs to public resources, other pub-
lic rights, or certain private interests. The environmental harm 
cases are simply an illustration of how the ratio guidepost has 
been tied too closely to a compensatory damages award rather 
than to the total harm caused by the defendant. This leads to 
cases where punitive damages are lowered excessively and thus 
not allowed to serve their primary purposes of punishment and 
deterrence. Notably, despite the significant attention given to 
punitive damages in general, over the past ten years, neither 
the Supreme Court nor legal scholars have given much, if any, 
attention to the problem of valuing harm. 
Part I of this Article explores the purposes of punitive 
damages and the factors juries consider in awarding punitive 
damages. This Part explains that, while punishment and deter-
rence are universally cited as the two purposes behind impos-
ing punitive damages, such damages were historically recog-
nized as also encompassing certain types of harm that the civil 
justice system did not “count” in computing compensatory 
damages. Part II traces the Supreme Court’s relatively short 
journey from being uninvolved in policing state court punitive 
damages awards to its creation of today’s constitutional due 
process standards. This Part shows that the Court’s new consti-
tutional ratio presumption is based, in large part, not only on 
the perceived problem of large punitive damages awards, but 
also on excessive nonpecuniary damages awards that serve to 
inflate both punitive damages awards and overall awards. 
Part III contains a review of intentional tort and environ-
mental harm cases issued since the Supreme Court’s 1996 
BMW v. Gore decision. The analysis in this Part reveals that 
 
 29. The court in Johansen avoided this error and allowed a ratio of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages of 100-to-1. Johansen v. Combustion 
Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999); see infra Part III.B.1 (dis-
cussing cases that reduced punitive damages to a single-digit ratio). 
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courts depart from single-digit ratios in the intentional tort 
cases without much difficulty, justifying their departure with 
rationales of punishment, deterrence, and the absence of large 
overall awards. By contrast, although the environmental harm 
cases in which the court awards punitive damages involve 
many of the same reasons to depart from single-digit ratios, 
courts have more difficulty identifying those reasons in such 
cases. The reason for this difficulty is because the compensato-
ry damages in these cases are often large, although, I argue, 
not sufficiently large to reflect the total harm the defendant 
caused or could potentially have caused to the affected natural 
resources. As a result, courts in the environmental harm cases 
struggle to apply the ratio and ensure an adequate penalty for 
the defendant’s misconduct. This Part concludes with an analy-
sis of the similarities and differences between the intentional 
tort cases on the one hand and the environmental harm cases 
on the other. The similarities support rejecting a mechanical 
approach to the ratio guidepost in both types of cases, while the 
differences demonstrate the need to adopt distinct approaches 
to the total awards. 
Part IV uses the cases discussed in Part III to create a 
framework within which courts can either attempt to value (or 
at least recognize) harm that goes unmeasured in calculating 
compensatory damages or, justify ratios that exceed single dig-
its. This Part shows that courts in the intentional tort cases 
should and do recognize that there is no valuation of the inva-
sion of the plaintiff ’s right in the calculation of compensatory 
damages, and allow recovery of punitive damages beyond sin-
gle-digit ratios. This Part then suggests a different approach 
for the environmental harm cases. In those cases, courts can at-
tempt to value harm to the environment beyond the plaintiff ’s 
compensatory damages, as a component of the reprehensibility 
of the misconduct. If such information is available, a single-
digit ratio can be appropriate. 
Where valuation measures for environmental harm are not 
available, courts should use the same approach applied in the 
intentional tort cases with small or nominal damages. This 
would help courts to recognize that harm to natural resources 
exists that cannot be valued, of a type which allows courts to 
depart from single-digit ratios. In both types of environmental 
harm situations, however, the full amount of punitive damages 
should not necessarily go to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff 
will be paying for the environmental restoration. If the plaintiff 
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will not be paying for the restoration, some portion of the puni-
tive damages should go to the government or nonprofit organi-
zations in an amount to be identified by state legislatures or 
the courts. The remaining portion would be awarded to the 
plaintiff, along with attorney’s fees, to create sufficient incen-
tives for bringing such suits. This “split-recovery” approach can 
be implemented by state legislatures or by courts using their 
inherent common law authority. 
The proposed framework relies on the flexibility that exists 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and suggests some re-
finements. Allowing higher punitive damages awards in envi-
ronmental harm cases (either through a full valuation of harm 
or a departure from a single-digit ratio) fills a gap that today’s 
environmental regulatory enforcement system is unable to ad-
dress. In this way, civil tort law can continue to play an optimal 
role in both environmental protection efforts and in other cases 
without the necessity of a government plaintiff that is willing 
or available to pursue defendants who have engaged in wrong-
doing that justifies punitive damages. 
I.  PURPOSE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES   
Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory 
or nominal damages, awarded against a defendant to punish 
him or her for outrageous conduct and to deter the defendant or 
others similarly situated from engaging in such conduct in the 
future.30 Commentators and courts generally are in agreement 
that the twin purposes of punitive damages are punishment 
and deterrence.31 According to the Supreme Court, although 
compensatory damages and punitive damages are usually 
awarded at the same time in our judicial system, they serve dif-
 
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). 
 31. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
432 (2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the main purposes of punitive dam-
ages are to punish the defendant and deter both the defendant and others 
from acting in a similar manner); LINDA L. SCHLUETER, 1 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
§ 1.4(B), at 16–17 (5th ed. 2005) (observing that the most widely accepted pur-
poses of punitive damages have been punishment and deterrence); Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 356–
57 (2003) (stating that courts and academic commentators agree that punish-
ment (or retribution) and deterrence are the two prevailing justifications for 
punitive damages). 
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ferent purposes.32 Compensatory damages “are intended to re-
dress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason 
of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”33 Punitive damages, by 
contrast, serve the broader functions of deterrence and retribu-
tion.34 Specifically, a state may allow imposition of punitive 
damages through its common law or by statute to further its 
legitimate interest in “punishing unlawful conduct and deter-
ring its repetition.”35 Because the purposes of punitive damages 
are to punish and deter wrongful conduct, states generally re-
quire, by statute or common law, that the defendant’s wrongful 
act be done intentionally or with willful indifference, deliberate 
disregard, malice, or a similar state of mind.36 
Today’s apparent unanimity regarding the purposes of pu-
nitive damages has not always existed. Historically, at least 
four other purposes have been identified, such as (1) preserving 
the peace; (2) inducing private law enforcement; (3) compensat-
ing victims of otherwise uncompensable losses; and (4) paying 
the plaintiff ’s attorney’s fees.37 Indeed, even today in a few 
states, the stated purpose of punitive damages is to provide ad-
ditional compensation to the injured plaintiff.38 Other states 
justify this additional compensation as a bounty for plaintiffs to 
bring suits acting as private attorneys general.39 By allowing 
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in appropriate cases, 
plaintiffs will have an incentive to fulfill important societal ob-
 
 32. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
 33. Id. (citing Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 903, at 453–54 (1979)). 
 34. Id. (citing Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. SCHLUETER, supra note 31, § 4.2(A)(2), at 159–62 (discussing the 
pleading requirements and the basis for a claim in a punitive damages case). 
 37. 2A STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:46, at 
167 (2003). 
 38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 2, at 9 (noting that some decisions 
have mentioned “reimbursing the plaintiff for elements of damage which are 
not legally compensable, such as wounded feelings or the expenses of suit” as 
an additional purpose of punitive damages); SPEISER ET AL., supra note 37 
(noting that punitive damages are intended, in part, to “reimburse for losses 
too remote to be considered elements of strict compensation” (citing Hofer v. 
Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984))). 
 39. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 37, § 8.46, at 169–70 (citing Stockett v. To-
lin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1560–61 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Miss., Inc. v. Maas, 516 So. 2d 495, 497 (Miss. 1990) (awarding punitive dam-
ages to plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general” to reward the plaintiffs’ 
public service and encourage litigation to address injustices)). 
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jectives by bringing a civil enforcement action for serious mis-
conduct.40 This is particularly true where the prospective com-
pensatory recovery is low or the expected cost of litigation is 
high.41 Thus, although punishment and deterrence are the 
most-cited justifications for imposing punitive damages, histor-
ic uses of punitive damages both to compensate plaintiffs for 
otherwise uncompensable harm and encourage private attorney 
general actions also are present in the case law. 
The instructions juries receive regarding the factors they 
can consider in awarding punitive damages will vary depending 
on a state’s goals. In many states, juries are instructed to con-
sider the reprehensibility of the misconduct, the profitability of 
the misconduct, the duration of the misconduct, the defendant’s 
concealment of the misconduct, the degree of the defendant’s 
awareness of its misconduct, the defendant’s attitude upon dis-
covering the misconduct, the defendant’s financial condition,42 
the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed as a 
result of the misconduct, and the relationship between the 
amount of punitive damages and the damage actually suffered 
by the plaintiff.43 
 
 40. Id. at 170 (citing Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985) 
(noting that the “potential for recovering an exemplary award” provides an in-
centive for “private civil enforcement of society’s rules against serious miscon-
duct”)). 
 41. Id. (citing Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1358). 
 42. Although the Supreme Court has warned that the wealth of a defen-
dant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional award, it has recognized 
that it is not inappropriate for states to allow juries to account for the defen-
dant’s wealth when assessing punitive damages, as many states do. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427–28 (2003) (citing 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring)); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991) (finding that 
Alabama’s standards for reviewing punitive damages awards, which allow a 
defendant’s wealth to be one of many considerations, sufficiently constrain 
jury discretion); see 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1066–68 (2001) (list-
ing a defendant’s wealth as one of the factors courts and legislatures present 
as a basis for assessing the amount of punitive damages). The rationale for al-
lowing juries to consider the defendant’s wealth in assessing punitive damag-
es, but not compensatory damages, is that it obviously takes more money to 
punish a wealthy defendant and deter future misconduct than it does a defen-
dant of modest means. See id. at 1068; infra notes 335–39 and accompanying 
text. 
 43. 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, at 1066–67 (listing the “traditional” factors 
for assessing punitive damages); SCHLUETER, supra note 31, § 5.6(F)(4), at 
338–40 (citing the provisions of a California model jury instruction); Rachel M. 
Janutis, Reforming Reprehensibility: The Continued Viability of Multiple Pu-
nitive Damages After State Farm v. Campbell, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1465, 
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Beyond the purposes of punitive damages, there has been 
much recent debate about their frequency, their rate of in-
crease, and their overall impact on the tort system and socie-
ty.44 In an effort to gather data on this topic, several studies 
have attempted to assess the impact of punitive damages. Ac-
cording to six major studies reviewing punitive damages 
awards since 1985, juries have awarded punitive damages in 
approximately 2%–9% of all cases where plaintiffs have won.45 
Assuming an average success rate of 50% for plaintiffs, these 
statistics mean that punitive damages were awarded in 1%–
4.5% of all civil trials. Although this number may not seem sig-
nificant, recent punitive damages awards in the millions and 
billions of dollars, particularly against tobacco companies and 
other product manufacturers, have made headlines in recent 
years.46 As a result, the issue of punitive damages is a signifi-
cant topic among tort scholars, interest groups, and state legis-
latures.47 
Despite the increasing size of the awards, until recently, 
state courts reviewed punitive damages awards without regard 
to federal constitutional concerns. Now, however, both trial and 
appellate courts must engage in a de novo substantive due 
process review of punitive damages under the United States 
 
1470–76 (2004) (setting forth jury instructions on punitive damages in numer-
ous states). 
 44. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 45. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 957, 964–65 (2007) (summarizing numerous empirical studies of puni-
tive damages since the 1980s); see Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Relation Be-
tween Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the 
Mass of Awards, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., forthcoming Nov. 2007) 
(manuscript at 5–21, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929565) (analyzing 
various data sets on punitive damages from 1985 through 2004). 
 46. W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1405, 1405–08, 1428 tbl.1 (2004) (discussing the media attention given to 
punitive damages awards, the interest of tort reformers, and the rise of 
“blockbuster” awards, ranging from $100 million to over $1 billion); see Wil-
liams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1167–68, 1171 (Or. 2006) (affirming 
a punitive damages award of $79.5 million against Philip Morris based on a 
plaintiff smoker’s compensatory damages award of $521,485), vacated sub 
nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); infra note 83 (dis-
cussing the activity of state legislatures and tort reformers). 
 47. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 46, at 1405 (“Punitive damages represent 
the most visible symptom of the ills of the U.S. tort system.”); infra note 82 
(citing debates over whether punitive damages really are a problem in today’s 
tort system). 
KLASS_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:36 AM 
94 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:83 
 
Constitution.48 Part II sets forth briefly the current constitu-
tional structure for awarding and reviewing punitive damages 
with a focus on some of the societal factors underlying the Su-
preme Court’s foray into this area. This review shows that this 
sea change in punitive damages jurisprudence arose predomi-
nantly from cases involving product liability claims with large 
personal injury components, and from consumer fraud cases 
involving nationwide misconduct. Because these cases involve 
little dispute over whether the plaintiff can quantify and recov-
er for the actual and potential damage flowing from the wrong-
ful conduct, the presumptive single-digit ratio may be appro-
priate. Many lower courts, however, have not always focused 
adequately on how the new due process rules can or should ap-
ply to cases in which total harm is difficult to value and thus 
difficult to recover as compensatory damages. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S JOURNEY FROM 
BYSTANDER TO POLICEMAN: NARROW CASES AND 
BROAD PRINCIPLES   
A. THE JOURNEY 
Prior to 1996, the Supreme Court had never used substan-
tive due process as a ground to invalidate as excessive a state 
court punitive damages award.49 The Court began moving in 
that direction beginning in 1989, however, in Browning-Ferris 
Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.50 In that case, the Court 
rejected a challenge to a punitive damages verdict under the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.51 The Court 
did suggest, though, that a state’s imposition of punitive dam-
ages might violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 48. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
443 (2001) (holding that appellate courts should apply a de novo standard in 
reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards). 
 49. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599–600 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the majority’s decision represents the first instance of 
the Court’s invalidation of a punitive damages award as unreasonably large); 
In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting 
that as of the time of the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, the Supreme Court had 
never invalidated a punitive damages award on grounds that the size of the 
award violated due process), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 50. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 51. Id. at 275–76. 
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Amendment.52 At the time of the Browning-Ferris decision, it 
was settled that there were procedural due process limitations 
on punitive damages, but less certainty existed regarding 
whether punitive damages were subject to substantive due 
process limitations beyond the rational basis review that ap-
plied to legislative penalties.53 
The Court squarely addressed the substantive due process 
issue for the first time in 1991 in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Haslip.54 In Haslip, the Court explained that it had his-
torically upheld punitive damages awarded by juries pursuant 
to state common law.55 However, the Court made clear that 
jury discretion in awarding punitive damages was not unlim-
ited. The opinion emphasized that the Court was under a con-
stitutional obligation to review the reasonableness of the award 
and the adequateness of judicial guidance to the jury in making 
the award.56 The Court held that the jury instructions were 
adequate and that the amount of punitive damages was not ex-
cessive, even though it was more than four times the amount of 
compensatory damages and twenty times the amount of the 
plaintiff ’s out-of-pocket expenses.57 
The Court again addressed constitutional limits on puni-
tive damages in 1993 in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp.58 In upholding a punitive damages award that, on 
its face, was 526 times the amount of compensatory damages,59 
the Court reasoned that, in assessing punitive damages, it was 
appropriate to consider the potential harm to the plaintiff and 
other possible victims that could have resulted from the defen-
dant’s wrongful conduct.60 Thus, the punitive damages award 
did not “‘jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.’”61 
 
 52. Id. at 276. The Court did not reach the issue of due process limitations 
on punitive damages because it found that the petitioners had not properly 
preserved the issue for appeal. Id. at 276–77. 
 53. Id.; see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55 
(1993) (stating that the respondents do not dispute that the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes a substantive limit on the amount of a punitive damages 
award but that they contend the Court’s scrutiny should be the same rational 
basis scrutiny appropriate for reviewing state economic legislation). 
 54. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1991). 
 55. Id. at 15–18. 
 56. Id. at 18–19. 
 57. Id. at 23. 
 58. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
 59. Id. at 459. 
 60. Id. at 461–62. 
 61. Id. at 462 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18). 
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These cases culminated in the Court’s decision in BMW,62 
where the Court for the first time struck down a punitive dam-
age verdict as excessive on due process grounds.63 The plaintiff 
in BMW had purchased a new BMW automobile that had been 
repainted without his knowledge prior to sale to hide a surface 
defect in the car.64 In the plaintiff ’s suit for fraud, the jury 
awarded $4000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in pu-
nitive damages (later reduced to $2 million) based on evidence 
that the defendant’s fraudulent practice was widespread.65 In 
holding that the punitive damages award violated due process, 
the Court established its now-famous three guideposts courts 
now must use to provide a constitutional review of punitive 
damages: (1) the reprehensibility of the misconduct; (2) the ra-
tio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) the 
difference between the punitive damages imposed and the civil 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.66 The 
Court held the reprehensibility guidepost was the most impor-
tant, and focused on assessing the flagrancy or enormity of the 
misconduct.67 
The Court reasoned that the ratio requirement ensured 
that the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff reasonably 
related to the penalty imposed on the defendant.68 The Court 
cited to early English statutes authorizing double, treble, or 
quadruple damages for particular wrongs as the historic 
grounding for a numerical relationship between compensatory 
and punitive damages.69 The Court recognized, however, that 
“low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a 
higher ratio” if a particularly egregious act resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages.70 The Court also acknowl-
edged that a higher ratio might be justified where “the injury is 
hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm 
might have been difficult to determine.”71 To round out the 
three guideposts, the Court stated that the focus on civil sanc-
 
 62. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 63. See id. at 585. 
 64. Id. at 563 & n.1. 
 65. Id. at 564–65. The state supreme court subsequently reduced the pu-
nitive damages award to $2 million. Id. at 567. 
 66. Id. at 575. 
 67. Id. at 575–76. 
 68. Id. at 580–81 & n.33. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 582. 
 71. Id. 
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tions for comparative misconduct was to ensure the defendant 
was on notice that its conduct could subject it to a significant 
penalty.72 
In 2003, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, the Court retained the BMW framework’s focus on 
reprehensibility of harm, appropriate ratios, and available civil 
penalties.73 In State Farm, the plaintiffs brought claims of bad 
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against their automobile insurer for mishandling their legal de-
fense in an accident claim.74 The jury awarded the plaintiffs 
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in pu-
nitive damages.75 The Supreme Court struck down the jury’s 
punitive damages award as unconstitutional.76 In reaching the 
decision, the Court provided more specific limits on the ratio 
between compensatory and punitive damages. While in BMW 
the Court merely set forth the ratio as an important guidepost, 
in State Farm it went further. 
The Court expressed its reluctance to “identify concrete 
constitutional limits” on the ratio between harm or potential 
harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.77 It 
went on to say, though, that the Court’s jurisprudence and 
principles demonstrate that in practice “few awards exceeding 
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damag-
es” will satisfy due process.78 While the Court retained some 
flexibility in the ratio test consistent with its statement in 
BMW,79 it warned that, when compensatory damages are sub-
stantial, “a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limits of the due process 
guarantee.”80 
The Court’s discussion of the ratio requirement in BMW 
and State Farm recognizes that punitive damages should be 
based on total harm where the compensatory damages award 
 
 72. Id. at 583–84. 
 73. 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). 
 74. Id. at 413–14. 
 75. Id. at 415. The trial court reduced the punitive damages award but 
the state supreme court reinstated it. Id. 
 76. Id. at 418. 
 77. Id. at 424. 
 78. Id. at 425. 
 79. Id. (reaffirming language in BMW that a larger ratio might be consti-
tutional if an “egregious act” results in a small amount of economic harm, if 
the injury is hard to detect, or if the monetary value is difficult to determine). 
 80. Id. 
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does not include all harm caused by the defendant’s miscon-
duct. The Court, however, provided little detail as to which cir-
cumstances would justify a disproportionate punitive damages 
award. This can be explained, perhaps, by the specific concerns 
the Court sought to address in both BMW and particularly in 
State Farm. These concerns and the Court’s response to them 
in its series of punitive damage cases are discussed in the next 
Section. 
B. REASONS FOR THE JOURNEY 
This Section proposes that the Court’s single-digit ratio 
presumption is driven not only by concerns of out-of-control 
punitive damages awards, but also by concerns of excessive, 
nonpecuniary compensatory damages awards in cases involving 
nationwide harm.81 As shown below, the Court’s majority and 
dissenting opinions throughout these cases express fears of 
large verdicts and excessive compensatory damages, in addition 
to excessive punitive damages. These concerns reflect the 
heightened public debates regarding punitive damages and tort 
law. During this period, reports of excessive awards in products 
liability, personal injury, and other tort lawsuits had increased, 
and such awards generated significant amounts of academic 
writing and news stories that continue to this day.82 State leg-
 
 81. Pecuniary damages compensate the plaintiff for the economic conse-
quences of the injury such as medical expenses, lost earnings, and loss of cus-
todial care. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.Y. 1989). 
Nonpecuniary damages compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering, loss of 
enjoyment of life, and other physical and emotional consequences of the injury. 
See id. 
 82. Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness When Awarding Mul-
tiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 931, 939–40 (2002) (stating that both the public and the courts are being 
misled by “[p]opular press reports [that] erroneously claim that the United 
States is in the midst of an unprecedented explosion of litigation with the indi-
scriminate use of punitive damages forcing legitimate enterprises out of exis-
tence”); Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real 
or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1129–32 (2005) (arguing that recov-
ery for noneconomic damages, such as awards for pain and suffering, “are 
starting to supplement punitive damages awards as a source of ‘jackpot jus-
tice’ damages for plaintiffs”); Sharkey, supra note 31, at 349 (“Large punitive 
damages awards get attention.”); Viscusi, supra note 46, at 1405 (“Punitive 
damages represent the most visible symptom of the ills of the U.S. tort sys-
tem.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)) (describing the proliferation of 
recent academic work on the jury’s role in determining punitive damages, and 
noting the Supreme Court and lower courts’ reliance on this academic work); 
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islatures also have responded to this “crisis” by enacting signif-
icant tort reform measures which include placing caps on both 
punitive damages and noneconomic damages.83 It is clear from 
many of the Court’s opinions that it wished to address the per-
ceived need to control excessive verdicts generally in addition 
to punitive damages specifically. These concerns appeared first 
in dissent in the early punitive damages cases, but came to ul-
timately underlie the majority opinion in State Farm. 
First, in Browning-Ferris, Justice O’Connor declared that 
“[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.”84 She cited 
several then-recent cases to illustrate a trend of new, multimil-
lion dollar awards.85 She also relied on various amicus briefs 
warning that the threat of such “enormous awards” was detri-
mentally affecting the research and development of new prod-
ucts, pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines, and motor vehicles.86 
Justice O’Connor’s concerns were not limited to the punitive 
 
Catherine M. Sharkey & Jonathan Klick, The Fungibility of Damage Awards: 
Punitive Damage Caps and Substitution 1 (Columbia Law Sch., Columbia Law 
and Econ. Working Paper No. 298; Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Law and 
Econ. Paper No. 912,256, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912256 
(noting that blockbuster punitive awards tend to dominate the academic and 
popular debates and have fueled recent legislative efforts to cap or constrain 
such awards); see also DAVID C. JOHNSON, THE ATTACK ON TRIAL LAWYERS 
AND TORT LAW 3–9 (2003), available at http://commonwealinstitute.org/ 
reports/TortReport.pdf (describing the right-wing tort reform agenda that is 
focused on achieving judicial and legislative reforms in limiting punitive dam-
ages and noneconomic harm); Eisenberg et al., supra note 45 (manuscript at 
3–4) (concluding that empirical data show that punitive damages have not in-
creased over time, are rarely awarded, and are most frequently awarded 
where intentional misbehavior occurred); American Tort Reform Association, 
About ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (stating 
that the ATRA supports an aggressive civil justice reform agenda that in-
cludes, among others, limits on punitive damages and limits on noneconomic 
damages). 
 83. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 17 (citing the success of tort reform advo-
cates in 2002 and 2003 to legislate state punitive damage caps in Alaska, Mis-
sissippi, and Texas, and noneconomic damage caps in Colorado, Idaho, Neva-
da, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia); Sharkey & Klick, supra note 
82, app. A, at 31 (showing twenty-one states with punitive damages caps, with 
most enacted beginning in the mid-1980s and through the 1990s); id. app. B, 
at 33 (showing seven states with caps on noneconomic damages). In a few 
states, courts have invalidated noneconomic damage caps as unconstitutional. 
Id. 
 84. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (citing Brief of the Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n. & Am. Med. Ass’n as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Browning-Ferris Indus. Inc. v. Kelco Dispos-
al, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (No. 88-556), 1989 WL 1127717, at *5–23). 
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damages at issue in the case before the Court, but related to 
the broader effect of large verdicts on technological and eco-
nomic development.87 
Justice O’Connor again dissented from the majority opin-
ion in Haslip, which upheld the punitive damages award at is-
sue as within constitutional boundaries.88 Her opinion called 
for more stringent constitutional limits because juries use puni-
tive damages to “target unpopular defendants, penalize unor-
thodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth. Multi-
million dollar losses are inflicted on a whim.”89 Emphasizing 
this point, Justice O’Connor noted “an explosion in the frequen-
cy and size of punitive damages awards”90 that appear to be 
“‘limited only by the ability of lawyers to string zeros together 
in drafting a complaint.’”91 Justice O’Connor declared a need to 
reevaluate the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence, in part 
because of the changes in the availability of compensatory 
damages. In the past, punitive damages were awarded to fill 
the gap “when compensatory damages were not available for 
pain, humiliation, and other forms of intangible injury.”92 With 
the changes in the law, however, punitive damages no longer 
appeared necessary to fill the compensatory gap.93 
Justice O’Connor’s opinions in these cases, particularly in 
Haslip, show a significant concern with the ability of the civil 
jury system to award noneconomic damages (whether compen-
satory or punitive) that are not arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The criticism is not limited to punitive damages claims but ap-
pears to extend to large verdicts generally, increases in com-
pensatory damages, and the effect of mass tort and product lia-
bility litigation. These broad concerns did not surface expressly 
in BMW, but made their way into Justice Stevens’ majority 
opinion in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 
Inc.94 In that case, the Court held for the first time that appel-
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 43. 
 90. Id. at 62. 
 91. Id. at 62 (quoting Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, 872 F.2d 312, 315 
(9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring)). 
 92. Id. at 61. 
 93. See id. at 61 (citing KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.3(A) 
(1980); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 
519–20 (1957)). 
 94. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
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late courts should apply a de novo standard in reviewing the 
constitutionality of punitive damages awards.95 The Court held 
that, unlike the measure of actual damages, the level of puni-
tive damages is not a “fact” that is “tried by the jury.”96 
In support of that proposition, the Court relied on the 
changing role of punitive damages and compensation for harm 
in the civil justice system. According to the Court, until well in-
to the nineteenth century, punitive damages “compensate[d] for 
intangible injuries” because recovery for such injuries “was not 
otherwise available under the narrow conception of compensa-
tory damages prevalent at the time.”97 As an example, the court 
noted that plaintiffs are generally allowed to recover pain and 
suffering damages in a compensatory award, whereas such 
harm was previously compensated by punitive damages.98 The 
increasing ability of plaintiffs to recover damages that histori-
cally were not subject to valuation for purposes of recovery 
eliminated the compensatory role of punitive damages. Accord-
ing to the Court, their changed role rendered them “less fac-
tual” and thus subject to a different standard of review than 
that applied to compensatory damages.99 The Court also rea-
soned that the new, more limited purpose of punitive damages 
justified closer constitutional scrutiny of such awards.100 
 
 95. Id. at 443. 
 96. Id. at 437 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 
415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. Id. at 437 n.11. According to other sources, courts have allowed recov-
ery for pain and suffering associated with physical injuries since ancient 
times, but it was not until well into the twentieth century that courts routine-
ly began allowing recovery for pure emotional distress and other nonpecuniary 
damages without physical impact. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 136, 141–46 (1992) (tracing the history of the judicial recognition of 
emotional distress claims); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of 
Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damag-
es, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 888 (1994) (stating that claims for nonmarket losses are 
far greater today than they were under traditional common law and that 
claims for pure emotional distress were not regularly permitted until well into 
the 1900s). 
 98. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437 n.11. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 437–38. But see Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages 
Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 164 (2003) (arguing that the Court made a histori-
cal error in Cooper Industries when it posited that punitive damages served 
primarily as a compensatory function in the early years of American tort law). 
Even if the Court was incorrect that the primary purpose of punitive damages 
in early tort law was to compensate for losses that were not previously recog-
nized as a category of compensatory damages but now are, the fact remains 
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Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court’s bright-line 
rule. She questioned the Court’s conclusion that punitive dam-
ages were less “factual” than nonpecuniary damages, which are 
just as difficult to quantify.101 She contended that punitive 
damages are “not unlike” the measure of actual damages suf-
fered in a noneconomic injury: “One million dollars’ worth of 
pain and suffering does not exist as a ‘fact’ in the world any 
more or less than one million dollars’ worth of moral out-
rage.”102 Thus, Justice Ginsburg saw no legal basis for applying 
one standard of review to pain and suffering damages and 
another to punitive damages. 
Finally, in State Farm, the majority questioned whether 
punitive damages continued to serve any purpose. In justifying 
its invalidation of a punitive damages award that exceeded the 
compensatory damages award by 145-to-1, the Court empha-
sized that compensatory damages in the case were “substan-
tial” ($1 million).103 The Court believed there was “likely” an 
overlap between the punitive damages award and the compen-
satory damages award because much of the compensatory 
award compensated for emotional distress caused by the out-
rage and humiliation the plaintiffs suffered.104 The Court went 
on to cite authority arguing that compensatory damages of this 
type already contain a punitive element, and stated that there 
is “‘no clear line of demarcation between punishment and com-
pensation’” in a case of this kind.105 Thus, the Court further li-
mited the role of punitive damages by questioning their role as 
a punitive measure in cases involving awards of nonpecuniary 
damages. Following its reasoning in Cooper Industries, the 
Court found the more limited role justified greater scrutiny of 
such awards. 
The Court has continued to narrow the role of punitive 
damages as evidenced by its most recent case, Philip Morris 
USA v. Williams, which was issued in February 2007.106 In that 
 
that compensation was and can still be a component of punitive damages. See, 
e.g., Sharkey & Klick, supra note 82 (suggesting that punitive damages and 
noneconomic compensatory damages are more fungible than has been ac-
knowledged); supra text accompanying notes 37–39 (discussing the historic 
purposes of punitive damages). 
 101. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 446–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. 
 103. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1979)). 
 106. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1057 (2007). 
KLASS_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:36 AM 
2007] VALUING HARM 103 
 
case, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a jury award to the 
wife of a smoker in a wrongful death claim for fraud and negli-
gence.107 The jury found that Philip Morris had engaged in a 
publicity campaign to undermine published concerns about the 
dangers of smoking.108 The jury awarded the plaintiff $79.5 
million in punitive damages, based on a total compensatory 
award of $821,485.80 ($21,485.80 in economic damages and 
$800,000 in noneconomic damages), resulting in a ratio of 
roughly 100-to-1.109 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the de-
fendant raised two issues. First, the defendant argued that the 
jury’s award violated due process because there was a “signifi-
cant likelihood” that a portion of the punitive damages award 
represented punishment for harm to nonparties rather than 
solely for harm or potential harm to the plaintiff.110 Second, the 
defendant argued that the punitive damages award was grossly 
excessive and violated due process by significantly exceeding 
the presumptive single-digit ratio set out in State Farm.111 
In its decision, the Court addressed the first issue but not 
the second issue.112 The Court held that due process prohibited 
a jury from imposing damages based on harm to nonparties.113 
It also held, however, that the jury could consider harm to non-
parties in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct.114 The Court reasoned that to allow the jury to punish 
the defendant for harm to “strangers to the litigation” would 
prevent the defendant from mounting a proper defense.115 The 
defendant would have insufficient facts as to the number of 
such nonparty victims, as well as the circumstances and se-
riousness of their injuries.116 The Court found that the jury in-
structions did not sufficiently narrow the jury’s consideration of 
harm to nonparties, resulting in a risk that the jury’s punitive 
damages award may punish the defendant not only for the rep-
 
 107. Id. at 1060–61. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), vacated 
sub nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). The Court’s 
opinion appears to contain a mathematical error in adding economic and non-
economic damages. The error has been corrected in the text of this Article. 
 110. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 111. Id. at 1061–62. 
 112. Id. at 1062. 
 113. Id. at 1063. 
 114. Id. at 1063–64. 
 115. Id. at 1063. 
 116. Id. 
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rehensibility of its conduct, but also for similar harm the de-
fendant may have caused to smokers not parties to the case.117 
The Court then remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme 
Court to allow that court to apply the standard set out in the 
opinion.118 Though it set out extensive standards regarding the 
permissible role of nonparty harm, the Court expressly refused 
to reach the issue of whether the punitive damages award was 
“grossly excessive” based on the ratio to compensatory damag-
es.119 
Like in its prior decisions, the Court in Williams was clear-
ly concerned about excessive damages awards, particularly 
those awarded in nationwide mass torts where numerous suits 
can result in multiple, and potentially overlapping, punitive 
damages awards. The Williams Court, however, implicitly as-
sumed that “strangers to the litigation” can bring their own 
lawsuits to recover not only punitive damages, but also damag-
es compensating economic and noneconomic harm such as pain 
and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and the like. Indeed, 
like the plaintiff in State Farm, the plaintiff in Williams recov-
ered far more in noneconomic damages ($800,000) than she did 
in economic damages ($21,485.80).120 
But what about cases where the noneconomic harm re-
mains uncompensated? The Court’s ratio analysis specifically 
allows for departing from single-digit ratios where economic 
harm is small or the injury is hard to detect or difficult to val-
ue.121 Thus, in cases where the plaintiff can establish the exis-
tence of actual or potential harm that is not included in com-
pensatory damages, the reviewing court should ensure that 
such harm is part of the ratio assessment. 
The next Part shows how since BMW, and particularly 
since State Farm, lower courts have fairly easily applied the 
presumptive single-digit ratio exception in cases involving 
small or nominal damages. Lower courts have more often failed 
to do so, however, where damages are more substantial but still 
fail to value all the actual or potential harm. 
 
 117. Id. at 1063–65. 
 118. Id. at 1065. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), vacated 
sub nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 121. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582–83 (1996). 
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III.  RECOGNIZING AND VALUING HARM   
A. THE INTENTIONAL TORT CASES POST-BMW 
This Section evaluates several intentional tort cases in-
volving claims for trespass, defamation, and civil rights viola-
tions. These cases are notable for several reasons. First, com-
pensatory damages were small or nominal and punitive 
damages far exceeded single-digit ratios. Second, the reviewing 
courts had to determine whether to apply a strict ratio or 
whether to use the language in BMW and State Farm to justify 
a higher ratio.122 Third, the reviewing courts had little difficul-
ty upholding punitive damages awards whose ratios to the 
compensatory damages awards far exceeded single digits. Fi-
nally, in each case, the court justified its decision by appealing 
to the punitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages, as 
well as the fact that compensatory damages in the case were 
nominal or very small. As a result, no punishment and deter-
rence of egregious conduct would result without departing from 
a single-digit ratio. 
None of these cases are difficult. These are not the cases 
that motivated the Supreme Court to develop constitutional 
limits on punitive damages in the first place. In most cases, the 
plaintiff recovers little or no compensatory damages. Thus, pu-
nitive damages in these cases ultimately represent some 
amount of harm not valued as compensatory damages. Though 
courts do not explicitly state their reasoning, these cases show 
that courts continue to use punitive damages to serve compen-
satory, as well as punitive and deterrent, goals where the tort 
system fails to recognize certain types of harm. 
1. Intentional Trespass Cases 
In 2002, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the 
constitutional ratio issue under BMW in an intentional tres-
pass suit.123 The court conducted a constitutional due process 
review of punitive damages in a case where the jury awarded 
the plaintiff $819 in rental value for the disputed land and 
 
 122. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425; BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (allowing 
higher ratios when the conduct is egregious and the economic injury is small, 
hard to detect, or difficult to value). 
 123. Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, No. C6-01-1572, 2002 WL 1163559, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2002). 
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$50,000 in punitive damages.124 The jury found that the defen-
dant deliberately disregarded the plaintiff ’s rights when the de-
fendant maintained that he owned the property and threatened 
to have the plaintiff arrested and have his farming equipment 
confiscated if he used the property.125 The defendant argued 
that because the ratio between punitive damages and compen-
satory damages was 61-to-1, the punitive damages award was 
unconstitutionally excessive under BMW.126 The court of ap-
peals disagreed and held that such arguments fail if there is a 
small compensatory award.127 The court reasoned that applying 
a strict-ratio requirement to a small compensatory damages 
award would “negate the purpose of deterring the defendant 
from engaging in the same reprehensible conduct in the fu-
ture.”128 
Other jurisdictions similarly have focused on the small 
amount of compensatory damages and the reprehensibility of 
the conduct in affirming punitive damages awards that far ex-
ceed single-digit ratios. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky reinstated a $5000 punitive damages award based on an 
award of nominal damages for the defendant’s intimidating and 
abusive behavior in blocking access to a road.129 To justify its 
decision, the court relied on the exception established in BMW, 
which permits higher ratios where an egregious act has re-
sulted in only a small amount of damage or when noneconomic 
harm is difficult to determine.130 The court also pointed to deci-
sions in other jurisdictions allowing ratios of 150-to-1 and high-
er where damages were small and the defendant in the case 
had acted with malice or oppression.131 
The Jacque case discussed in the introduction to this Ar-
ticle also follows this rationale. In Jacque, the Wisconsin Su-
 
 124. Id. at *6. 
 125. Id. at *1. 
 126. Id. at *6. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Roberie v. VonBokern, No. 2004-SC-00250-DG, 2006 WL 2454647, at 
*3 (Ky. Aug. 24, 2006). 
 130. Id. at *7 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 
(1996)). 
 131. Id. at *8 (citing Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (upholding a punitive damages award of $15,000 based on nominal 
damages of $100); Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 164 (2d Cir. 
2001) (upholding a $10,000 punitive damages award where there was no com-
pensable injury and only nominal damages of $1)). 
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preme Court upheld a punitive damages award of $100,000 
based on a $1 nominal damages award for the corporate defen-
dant’s trespass across the plaintiff ’s property after the plaintiff 
had denied access.132 In finding the award consistent with due 
process, the court emphasized that a private landowner’s right 
to exclude is “‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”133 The 
court asserted that, beyond protecting the interests of the indi-
vidual landowner, society also has an interest in preventing 
landowners from resorting to self-help remedies, which re-
quires assuring landowners as a group that the legal system 
will appropriately punish wrongdoers.134 Based on the egre-
giousness of the defendant’s conduct in this case, the court con-
cluded that BMW did not require a mathematical bright-line 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages and that 
adhering to the ratio “would turn the concept of punitive dam-
ages on its head.”135 These cases provide examples of how 
courts properly recognize the important role of punitive damag-
es in providing redress for invasions of personal rights that are 
not tied directly to a compensatory damages award.136 
2. Defamation and Civil Rights Cases 
Cases involving claims for defamation137 or violations of 
civil rights resemble the trespass cases in that courts have al-
 
 132. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997). 
 133. Id. at 159–60 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 
(1994)). 
 134. Id. at 160–61. 
 135. Id. at 164–65; see Gianoli v. Pfleiderer, 563 N.W.2d 562, 570 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1997) (upholding a punitive damages award of $200,000 based on a com-
pensatory damages award of $12,000 in a land-based tort case on the grounds 
that conduct toward neighbors was outrageous and that the case was “not a 
situation in which a runaway jury awarded mind-boggling punitive damages 
that require a reining in by a judge”). 
 136. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1093, 1098 (2005) (stating that punitive damages can be justified as a “means 
of protecting the plaintiff ’s individual tort right from wrongful infringements 
by the defendant”); Sebok, supra note 45, at 1036 (advising that punitive dam-
ages “fit within a scheme of civil recourse and provide a unique form of redress 
where citizens have suffered the indignity of a willful violation of their private 
rights”). 
 137. Defamation is a communication that tends “to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 559 (1977). Because of First Amendment concerns, plaintiffs who are 
public officials or public figures must establish that the defendant “published 
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lowed punitive damages to be based upon nominal damages if 
the defendant acted with sufficient malice, deliberate disre-
gard, or other intent sufficient to justify an award of punitive 
damages.138 Judicial analysis of punitive damages in these cas-
es often focuses on the need to effectively punish and deter the 
defendants’ egregious conduct that was directed specifically at 
the plaintiff.139 Thus, these opinions imply that punitive dam-
ages serve as redress where the judicial system does not com-
pensate for the harm associated with the violation of the per-
sonal right. 
Significantly, there is no reason courts could not attempt to 
value the violation of the right and award compensatory dam-
ages for such noneconomic harm. Courts have valued other 
nonpecuniary injuries such as pain and suffering and loss of en-
joyment of life.140 Indeed, a move in this direction would avoid 
reliance on the Supreme Court’s exception to single-digit ratios, 
and may increase certainty and precision in damages 
awards.141 For now, though, courts facing situations involving 
noneconomic harm continue to use punitive damages which ex-
ceed single-digit ratios—rather than increased compensatory 
damages—to pursue deterrent, punitive, and even compensato-
ry goals. Whatever the court’s approach, the Supreme Court 
has given lower courts the flexibility to award higher punitive 
damages in cases if awarding that same amount as compensa-
tory damages would be a stretch under current law.142 
 
a knowing or reckless falsehood” to recover presumed or actual damages for 
defamation. 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, at 1121, 1192. Where the issue involves a 
matter of public concern, private-figure plaintiffs must establish negligence or 
some other fault plus actual damages and, if warranted, punitive damages. Id. 
Where the alleged defamation is of no public concern, private-figure plaintiffs 
can recover presumed damages and punitive damages, if appropriate. Id. 
 138. See Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843, 874–75 (N.D. Iowa 
2004) (“[M]any civil rights violations will fall into this category of cases in 
which it is difficult to assess a monetary value to the harm suffered, thus re-
sulting in only the imposition of nominal damages, but where punitive damag-
es are warranted.”); 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, at 1192. 
 139. See Sherman, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 874–75. 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing judicial recognition 
of pain and suffering damages). 
 141. But see infra notes 325–26 and accompanying text (discussing the lack 
of precision in jury instructions for awards of pain and suffering and other 
nonpecuniary damages). 
 142. See Sebok, supra note 45, at 1036 (proposing a theory of punitive 
damages that “provide[s] a unique form of redress where citizens have suf-
fered the indignity of a willful violation of their private rights”). 
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For instance, in 2005, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit upheld a punitive damages award of 
$600,000 against officers in a civil rights unlawful arrest case, 
despite a compensatory damages award of only $279.05.143 Ca-
sino security officers placed a seventy-two-year-old casino pa-
tron in a security office, told her that she had committed a 
crime, handcuffed her, photocopied her identification, reported 
her to the state police, refused to let her use the bathroom 
alone, and forced her to wait outside in the heat for her after-
noon bus home.144 The security officers subjected the plaintiff to 
this treatment because they suspected her of stealing one nick-
el from a slot machine.145 
In its analysis of the constitutionality of the punitive dam-
ages award, the court emphasized that the case was not about a 
monetary injury, but about a violation of the elderly plaintiff ’s 
right not to be unreasonably seized and detained in an outra-
geous manner.146 Relying on BMW and prior civil rights cases, 
the court found that “where ‘injuries are without a ready mone-
tary value,’ such as invasions of constitutional rights unaccom-
panied by physical injury or other compensable harm,” higher 
ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages should be 
expected.147 
Likewise, in a 2006 defamation case from the United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas, although the 
court reduced the punitive damages award from $150,000 to 
$50,000, the 20-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages remained in excess of the single-digit ratio.148 The 
court recognized that “the monetary value of harm to reputa-
tion is difficult to determine” and that the plaintiff ’s intangible 
harm to reputation “transcends out-of-pocket loss.”149 Although 
the court reduced the award, the driving force behind the re-
duction was the rationale that a more modest amount would be 
 
 143. Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 635, 649–50 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (upholding a punitive damages award but reducing it from 
$875,000). 
 144. Id. at 632–34. 
 145. Id. at 632. 
 146. Id. at 645. 
 147. Id. at 645–46 (quoting Argentine v. United Steel Workers of Am., 
AFL-CIO, 287 F.3d 476, 488 (6th Cir. 2002) (sustaining a 42.5-to-1 ratio and a 
$400,000 punitive damages award in a union retaliation case)). 
 148. Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna, Inc., No. 04-2597-KHV, 
2006 WL 3021109, at *5–7 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 2006). 
 149. Id. at *6. 
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sufficient to achieve punishment and deterrence—not the ratio 
guidepost.150 
These cases show that courts routinely invoke BMW in de-
parting from single-digit ratios where the act is egregious, but 
the actual damages are small. One reason is that concerns of 
the jackpot justice system of multimillion dollar awards and 
their hindering effect on commerce—concerns which prompted 
a reining in of punitive damage verdicts—are simply not 
present in these cases. These cases involve discrete parties 
where the total damages, both compensatory and punitive, do 
not approach even $1 million. Thus, courts more easily allow 
disproportionate punitive damages awards. 
More important, courts in these cases recognize, at least 
implicitly, that the punitive damages awards should reflect the 
injury to the plaintiff, and serve to punish and deter the defen-
dant.151 Such a goal is consistent with the Supreme Court’s rec-
ognition that where such harm is not recoverable as compensa-
tory damages, there is a greater role for punitive damages.152 
Although the Court has made clear that punitive damages’ 
compensatory component has no place in cases where signifi-
cant nonpecuniary damages are awarded,153 lower courts have 
justified disproportionate punitive damages awards to reflect 
the value of the individual’s interest in the integrity of his or 
her rights.154 These courts appeared to assume that there were 
no (or very little) compensatory damages in cases associated 
with violation of those rights, so it was appropriate to rely on 
 
 150. Id. at *6–7. 
 151. See Nemecek v. Santee, No. 05-0518, 2006 WL 334298, at *3 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Feb. 15, 2006) (stating that “harm” does not equate with “damages” and 
concluding that the harm “clearly exceeded the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded him”); Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 429 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (focusing on punishment and deterrence but also dis-
cussing the need for punitive damages to ensure society’s reinforcement of 
personal accountability); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 
160 (Wis. 1997) (noting that the law infers some damage for direct entry on 
the land of another, whether or not compensatory damages are awarded, as 
nominal damages represent recognition that although “immeasurable in mere 
dollars, actual harm has occurred”) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 13, 
at 67–84). 
 152. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
437–48, n.11 (2001) (noting that the types of compensatory damages available 
to plaintiffs, including pain and suffering, broadened in the twentieth century, 
rendering it unnecessary for punitive damages to contain a compensatory 
component to account for a plaintiff ’s inability to recover for those injuries). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra notes 123–50 and accompanying text. 
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punitive damages to punish and deter interference with those 
rights as well as value that uncompensated harm. 
The courts’ practice of using punitive damages for multiple 
purposes where the plaintiff cannot easily value the harm in 
monetary terms should be extended beyond the “easy” cases de-
scribed above to cases involving environmental harm or other 
cases involving difficult valuation issues. The next Section 
presents several examples of environmental harm cases and 
argues that, in contrast to the intentional torts cases, lower 
courts in environmental harm cases have not fully embraced 
the Court’s suggestion that where harm is difficult to value 
economically a higher ratio is constitutional. 
B. THE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM CASES 
The environmental harm cases discussed below have much 
in common with the intentional tort cases analyzed in the pre-
vious Section. First, both types of cases involve defendants who 
acted with malice, deliberate indifference, extreme reckless-
ness, or another mental state required under state law to im-
pose punitive damages. Second, both types of cases involve pri-
vate party or local government plaintiffs attempting to recover, 
not only for harm to their own economic interests, but also for 
harm to broader interests. In cases involving environmental 
damage, the defendant has caused harm to the environment 
(air, water, soil, etc.) for which the plaintiff cannot (and some-
times should not) be compensated because of standing limita-
tions or valuation difficulties. As a result, compensatory dam-
ages awards, though often large in these cases, undervalue the 
harm, and courts risk undermining punishment and deterrence 
if they insist on applying the single-digit ratio presumption. 
There are two types of environmental cases in this Section. 
First, I discuss cases in which courts fail to include harm to the 
environment as part of compensatory damages, apply a single-
digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, and reduce the 
jury’s punitive damages award. In these cases, courts do not 
recognize that some or all of the environmental harm was not 
valued, and also fail to utilize the Supreme Court’s exception to 
single-digit ratios to award a more appropriate damage 
amount. Second, I discuss cases in which the courts more fully 
recognize environmental harm. Both types of cases are instruc-
tive in showing the difficulty in valuing environmental harm 
and the impact that difficulty has on the amount of punitive 
damages the court awards. 
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1. Undervaluing Environmental Harm 
The Alabama Supreme Court faced the issue of underval-
ued environmental harm in a 2000 case where landowners sued 
a nearby hog feedlot under theories of nuisance, negligence, 
and trespass for damage to their property and for environmen-
tal harm.155 One defendant, Tyson Foods, had contracted with 
the landowner-defendant to maintain a hog farm for the benefit 
of Tyson.156 Shortly after the hog farm went into operation, it 
began emitting noxious odors and discharging waste into a 
stream and onto the plaintiffs’ property.157 The plaintiffs pre-
sented evidence at trial that, although both defendants knew 
about the ongoing air and water pollution, they did not make 
the necessary repairs.158 
At trial, the only damages the plaintiffs recovered were for 
diminution in value to their property based upon the “smells 
coming from [the defendant’s] property, as well as upon the 
waste that flowed onto the [plaintiffs’] property.”159 The trial 
court specifically charged the jury that the compensatory dam-
ages, if any, would be “the difference in the reasonable market 
value of the property of the plaintiffs with the nuisance, and 
the value of what the property would have been had the nuis-
ance not existed.”160 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2500 in 
compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.161 
In conducting its constitutional review of the punitive 
damages award, the state supreme court discussed all of the 
BMW factors. With respect to reprehensibility, the court found 
that both defendants were aware of the continuing pollution, 
knew how to fix it, and were financially able to do so.162 The 
court concluded that the conduct was “fairly reprehensible” but 
not “highly reprehensible.”163 Next, in applying the ratio pre-
sumption, the court found that a ratio of 30-to-1 was unreason-
able under Alabama law and BMW.164 The court reasoned that, 
although the plaintiffs had “endured the odors that emanated 
 
 155. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783 So. 2d 804, 805–07 (Ala. 2000). 
 156. Id. at 806. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 808. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 807. 
 162. Id. at 809. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 810. 
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from the farm, as well as the frequent overflow across their 
land, the jury awarded only $2500 in compensatory damages” 
and the defendants later stopped raising hogs.165 Based on its 
conclusion that a 30-to-1 ratio was unreasonable, the court re-
duced the punitive damages award to $25,000.166 The court did 
not explain how it arrived at $25,000, but did discuss the state 
law factors that justified the reduction.167 The court focused on 
the fact that the likelihood of additional harm to the plaintiffs 
was “nonexistent,” that the harm was reprehensible but not “so 
reprehensible,” the lack of criminal sanctions imposed, the im-
plicit assumption that the punitive award was a sufficient in-
centive for potential plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial, and 
the fact that “the jury did not find the actual harm suffered by 
the [plaintiffs] significant enough to require a large compensa-
tory-damages award.”168 
However, not all justices agreed with the remittitur of 
damages. One justice thought “the defendants’ environmental 
pollution so egregious that the entire punitive award is justi-
fied.”169 Another justice, by contrast, argued that the punitive 
damages should be reduced not to $25,000, but to $20,000.170 
His reasoning stemmed from his proposal in an earlier case to 
adopt a stricter mathematical presumption for evaluating any 
punitive damages award under Alabama law and BMW. Under 
his approach, punitive damages in all cases would be the great-
er of $20,000 or three times the compensatory damages award; 
applying that theory to this particular case resulted in a 
$20,000 punitive damages award.171 
The justices’ varying conclusions reflect their different 
views of both the nature of the harm the defendant caused and 
how the punitive damages award should relate to that harm. 
The majority and one other justice measured the harm by the 
compensatory damages awarded at trial, which consisted solely 
of the economic diminution in value to the plaintiffs’ proper-
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 810–11. 
 168. Id. (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala. 1989)). 
The court noted that other people living near the hog farm incurred “the same 
kind of injury the Stevenses suffered.” Id. 
 169. Id. at 811–12 (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 170. Id. at 811 (Houston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 171. See id. (citing Prudential Ballard Realty Co. v. Weatherly, 792 So. 2d 
1045, 1052–54 (Ala. 2000) (Houston, J., concurring)). 
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ty.172 However, the compensatory award did not represent any 
part of the environmental damage to the stream, resulting in 
the conclusion that punitive damages were excessive.173 Be-
cause the court assessed the reasonableness of punitive damag-
es awards by calculating the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages, the artificially low compensatory figure caused the 
court to characterize as excessive a punitive damages award 
which may not have been based on the total harm.174 Yet 
another justice, by contrast, saw this as a case of “environment-
al pollution” and one so “egregious” that the punitive damages 
the jury awarded were not unreasonable.175 Similarly, the jury, 
though careful to follow instructions and award compensatory 
damages only for economic harm, attempted to account for the 
defendant’s reprehensible conduct in polluting the environment 
through its punitive damages award.176 The Alabama Supreme 
Court, however, reduced the award to correspond more directly 
with the compensatory damages in the case (creating a 10-to-1 
ratio),177 and in doing so erased the noneconomic harm that 
was “difficult to determine.”178 
An Iowa federal district court in 1998 similarly frustrated 
a jury’s attempt to award punitive damages based in part on 
unmeasured environmental harm.179 In E.T. Holdings, Inc. v. 
Amoco Oil Co., the plaintiff, a shopping center owner, sued 
Amoco Oil Company for nuisance and trespass in connection 
with petroleum that had leaked from the defendant’s nearby 
gas station and migrated to the plaintiff ’s property, which re-
 
 172. Id. at 810–12. 
 173. Id. at 810–11. 
 174. See id. at 809–10. 
 175. Id. at 811–12 (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). In Ballard Realty, Justice Houston established his formula of a $20,000 
award or three times the compensatory damages award. Ballard Realty Co., 
792 So. 2d at 1052 (Houston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Johnstone also concurred, stating that he agreed with Justice Hou-
ston’s benchmark approach but that it may require reevaluation in “peculiar” 
cases. Id. at 1056 (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Apparently, Justice Johnstone found the facts surrounding the environmental 
pollution in the Tyson case sufficiently “peculiar” to warrant departing signifi-
cantly from Justice Houston’s benchmark approach. Id. 
 176. See Tyson Foods, 783 So. 2d at 811. 
 177. Id. 
 178. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). 
 179. E.T. Holdings, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., No. C95-1034 MJM, 1998 WL 
34113907, at *14–16 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 27, 1998). 
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sulted in soil and groundwater contamination.180 At trial, the 
plaintiff established that Amoco knew that the tanks at its sta-
tion were leaking and that the petroleum was migrating offsite 
for several years before it reported the contamination to the 
state or anyone else.181 Despite continuous urging by its envi-
ronmental employees, Amoco continued to store gasoline in the 
tanks, neglected to perform an assessment, and, even after it 
reported the contamination, refused to install the appropriate 
remediation system to avoid the spread of contamination.182 
Amoco did not wish to put more money into an unprofitable 
station.183 It was not until more than five and one-half years af-
ter the company discovered the contamination that it finally 
closed the station and removed the tanks.184 
At trial, the plaintiff sought compensatory damages and 
punitive damages. The jury awarded compensatory damages of 
$1.7 million, which was the plaintiff  expert’s estimate of the 
decrease in fair market value attributable to the contamina-
tion.185 The jury also awarded the plaintiff $15 million in puni-
tive damages based on Amoco’s conduct.186 Following the jury’s 
verdict, the district court conducted a constitutional due 
process review of the punitive damages award under BMW.187 
The court acknowledged that punitive damages were appropri-
ate based on Amoco’s reckless operation of the station for sev-
eral years after it had knowledge that the tanks were leaking, 
contrary to the advice of its own employees and consultants.188 
The court also focused on the fact that Amoco operates hun-
dreds of gas stations in the United States, conducts operations 
throughout the world, and, in 1997, had revenues of $17.667 
billion and earnings of $168 million.189 The court noted that the 
benzene levels under the shopping mall were severely elevated 
and that Amoco’s conduct had caused significant contamina-
tion.190 
 
 180. Id. at *1. 
 181. Id. at *3–9. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *12, *15. 
 184. Id. at *9. 
 185. Id. at *10, *16. 
 186. Id. at *14. 
 187. Id. at *14–16. 
 188. See id. at *16 (“[T]he Court finds that the punitive damages verdict 
was not the product of passion or prejudice.”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at *15. 
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Despite these findings, the court ordered a remittitur of the 
punitive damages award to $2 million, reasoning that: (1) the 
jury accepted the plaintiff ’s expert’s estimate as to the loss of 
value to the shopping center and thus the plaintiff was “fully 
compensated” for its claimed damages; (2) Amoco had eventual-
ly spent considerable time and money to clean up the problem; 
and (3) the reduced amount of punitive damages represented 
slightly more than 1% of Amoco’s earnings and thus was ade-
quate punishment.191 This case, like the Alabama case, shows 
that the court’s perception that the plaintiff has been compen-
sated “in full” drives the court to apply the ratio factor to re-
duce punitive damages. However, the court’s reduction of puni-
tive damages resulted from a failure to value the harm the 
defendant caused to natural resources. Because the plaintiff 
did not own the land surrounding its shopping center, it could 
not seek compensation for the significant contamination to sur-
rounding groundwater and soil. The court’s refusal to acknowl-
edge this significant damage and its reliance on the plaintiff ’s 
“full compensation” resulted in an unjustified reduction of pu-
nitive damages.192 
The same phenomenon occurred to a lesser extent in a 
2006 California case. The city of Modesto, California sued Vul-
can Materials Company, Dow Chemical Company, and several 
other defendants for marketing perchloroethylene (PCE) to dry 
cleaners.193 Substantial evidence demonstrated that, as of the 
late 1970s, defendants Vulcan and Dow knew PCE was hazard-
ous and a potential human carcinogen, and also knew it had 
contaminated and would further contaminate public drinking-
water supplies.194 
After a four-month trial, the jury awarded $3,173,834 in 
compensatory damages along with $100 million in punitive 
damages against Vulcan and $75 million against Dow.195 The 
city’s compensatory damages consisted solely of its “economic 
damages,” consisting of the city’s environmental investigation 
costs and wellhead filtration costs.196 The court’s opinion con-
 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Dow Chem. Co., Nos. 999345, 
999643, 2006 WL 2346275, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2006). 
 194. Id. at *7. 
 195. Id. at *1. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $75,000 against 
a third defendant, R.R. Street & Co. Id. 
 196. Id. at *1, *8. 
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tained no discussion of the broader effects of the contamination 
to the aquifer, the permanence of the impairment, or any other 
valuation of public harm. In reviewing the jury’s punitive dam-
ages award, the court relied on both California law197 and the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional guideposts,198 and concluded 
that California due process “mirrors” federal due process.199 
In applying the state and federal due process standards, 
the court agreed that substantial evidence supported the jury’s 
finding that the conduct of Vulcan and Dow was “despicable 
and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the 
rights or safety of another.”200 The court, however, relied heavi-
ly on the ratio guidepost in holding that the award exceeded 
state and federal due process limits.201 Noting that few awards 
exceeding single-digit ratios will satisfy due process, the court 
also concluded the exception to this presumption did not apply 
because damages were not small, hard to detect, or hard to 
measure.202 The court then stated that ratios of 3- or 4-to-1 “ex-
press the due process norm” and should apply to the case.203 
The court rejected the city’s argument that it should meas-
ure the reasonableness of punitive damages in relation to the 
$40 million required to remediate the groundwater instead of 
the $3 million compensatory award.204 The court reasoned that 
the $40 million cost to remove PCE from the city wells was an 
“unrealistic” estimate.205 Based on a $3 million measure of 
harm, a 4-to-1 ratio, and an allocation of the punitive damages 
between the two defendants based on various factors, the court 
held that a $7,254,115 punitive damages award against Vulcan 
and a $5,441,221 punitive damages award against Dow was 
“the maximum constitutional award [allowable] under both 
 
 197. Under California law, the court reviewed: “(1) the reprehensibility of 
defendant’s conduct, (2) the requirement of a reasonable relationship between 
the amount of punitive damages and the harm to the plaintiff, . . . (3) in view 
of the defendant’s financial condition, the amount that is necessary to punish 
the defendant and discourage future wrongful conduct,” and (4) “the difference 
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties au-
thorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id. at *6 (citing Simon v. San Paolo 
U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2005)). 
 198. Id. at *5 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at *7 (listing instructions given to the jury). 
 201. Id. at *10–13, *16–17. 
 202. Id. at *10–11. 
 203. Id. at *11. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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federal and state due process.”206 The reduced award against 
Vulcan represented one-third of one percent of its net worth 
and the reduced award against Dow amounted to less than 
four-hundredths of one percent of its net worth.207 
While the punitive damages awarded were a significant 
sum, in setting a 4-to-1 ratio, the court refused to value any en-
vironmental harm other than that attributable to the imme-
diate cost to the city in providing water to its residents. Even if 
the $40 million cleanup price tag was unrealistic, the court 
completely ignored the long-term harm to the resource itself 
when it calculated the “harm” against which to measure puni-
tive damages. 
This is not to say courts should never reduce a jury’s puni-
tive damages award in environmental harm cases.208 Courts 
always have exercised review over punitive damages and 
should continue to do so. The analysis here, though, cautions 
that, in conducting a ratio review under state law or federal 
due process, courts should ensure they account for harm caused 
by the defendant that is difficult to measure as compensatory 
damages. Below, I discuss several cases in which courts do con-
sider harm to public resources in analyzing the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages. In some cases, this consid-
eration enters into the court’s decision because either a private 
or government party has quantified the harm for the court. In 
other cases, the harm was not quantified, but received suffi-
cient attention to allow the court to either depart from a single-
digit ratio based on BMW and State Farm or allow punitive 
damages at the outer limit of the ratio guidepost. 
2. Recognizing Environmental Harm 
In Johansen,209 discussed in the introduction of this Ar-
ticle, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
punitive damages award that was one hundred times the com-
pensatory damages award did not violate federal due process 
limits.210 In that case, the plaintiff-landowners sued the defen-
dant mining company for allowing acidic water to escape from 
the mining site and pollute streams that flowed onto the plain-
 
 206. Id. at *14–15. 
 207. Id. at *15. 
 208. See SCHLUETER, supra note 31, § 6.4(B), at 379–83 (discussing judicial 
review of the adequacy and excessiveness of punitive damages awards). 
 209. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 210. Id. at 1339. 
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tiffs’ properties.211 The final award consisted of $47,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $4.35 million in punitive damages.212 
In reviewing the $4.35 million punitive damages award, the 
court of appeals found that, because the defendant had ulti-
mately cooperated in attempting to address the environmental 
harm, the defendant’s conduct was not severely reprehensi-
ble.213 
The court, however, focused on other factors to justify a 
punitive damages award that was one hundred times the com-
pensatory damages. Relying on BMW ’s instruction that higher 
ratios are allowed where the injury is hard to detect or “the 
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult 
to determine,”214 the court found that “[t]his is such a case” jus-
tifying departure.215 The court recognized that the actual dam-
ages awarded were small, but that “the state’s interest in de-
terring the conduct—environmental pollution—is strong.”216 As 
a result, “ratios higher than might otherwise be acceptable are 
justified.”217 The court also relied on Supreme Court authority 
which suggested that the wealth of the defendant may be con-
sidered in order to promote the deterrence function of punitive 
damages.218 The defendant in this case was an “extremely 
wealthy international corporation” and the court suggested the 
award should attract the attention of the company’s environ-
mental decision-makers and other managers.219 
Although Johansen was decided prior to the more stringent 
ratio requirements announced in State Farm, the court recog-
nized that a punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 100-to-
1 was large enough to “raise a suspicious eyebrow,”220 and 
noted that there is no “mathematical bright line” for a constitu-
 
 211. Id. at 1326. 
 212. Id. at 1326–27. The jury originally awarded $45 million in punitive 
damages which the lower court reduced first to $15 million based on state law, 
and later to $4.35 million based on the BMW guideposts. See id. 
 213. Id. at 1336. 
 214. Id. at 1338 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 
(1996)). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 
n.28 (1993)). 
 219. Id. at 1338–39. 
 220. Id. at 1338 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tionally acceptable ratio.221 Thus, to defend its punitive damag-
es award, the court emphasized the fact that the compensatory 
damages in the case did not reflect the harm to the important 
state interest in preventing environmental pollution.222 In this 
way, the court considered the full scope of the harm the defen-
dant caused in evaluating the constitutionality of the award. 
While Johansen is instructive because it conducted a full 
review of harm, the Louisiana Court of Appeals’s decision in 
Grefer v. Alpha Technical223 in 2005 is also instructive, despite 
the fact that the Supreme Court recently vacated and re-
manded the decision for further consideration in light of Phillip 
Morris USA v. Williams.224 The lower court’s decision contains 
a helpful analysis because it recognized that, where most or all 
of the environmental harm is reflected in the compensatory 
award, single-digit ratios can be appropriate. In Grefer, the 
plaintiff-landowners sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and other 
defendants for contaminating their property with radioactive 
materials in the process of obtaining oil from the plaintiffs’ 
property.225 Even though Exxon knew that the property had be-
come contaminated with radioactivity, it did not disclose this to 
the plaintiffs or anyone else.226 Several years later, testing on 
the property revealed the contamination and the plaintiffs sued 
for compensatory and punitive damages.227 
After a five-week trial, a jury awarded the plaintiffs com-
pensatory damages of $56,145,000, of which $56 million was 
the cost of restoring the property to its original condition.228 
 
 221. Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 576) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 222. Id.; see Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l. Carbon, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-994-
MEF, 2006 WL 173653, at *7–8 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2006) (affirming a punitive 
damages award nearly ten times that of the compensatory damages award for 
wrongful emissions of carbon black onto plaintiffs’ properties and stating that 
the case would have supported a much larger punitive damages award be-
cause of the reprehensibility of the conduct, injury to the environment, and 
need to deter the defendant and others from a “pollute and pay” environment-
al policy) (citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1339 
(11th Cir. 1999)), aff ’d, 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 
76 USLW 3082 (U.S. Aug 24, 2007) (No. 07-257). 
 223. 901 So. 2d 1117 (La. Ct. App. 2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007). 
 224. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 225. Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1124–28. 
 226. Id. at 1127. 
 227. Id. at 1127–28. The plaintiffs’ claims were for negligence, strict liabili-
ty, nuisance, and fraud. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1128. 
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The jury also awarded $1 billion in punitive damages.229 In re-
viewing the compensatory damages award, the court first re-
jected Exxon’s argument that it was completely unreasonable 
to award $56 million in restoration costs for a property worth 
only $1.5 million.230 The court responded that disputes between 
private litigants over remediation costs also involve considera-
tion of state environmental standards and interests because of 
the state’s role as the public trustee for environmental protec-
tion.231 Thus, the court held that it was appropriate for the jury 
to award restoration costs, and that the jury was not restricted 
to considering only the minimum legal cleanup standards.232 
The court then conducted a federal due process review of 
the punitive damages. It focused, in large part, on the fact that 
the compensatory damages in the case were substantial and far 
exceeded the property’s value of $1.5 million.233 The court con-
cluded that, under these circumstances, a 2-to-1 ratio was the 
highest that could comport with due process.234 Accordingly, 
the court ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages award 
from $1 billion to $112,290,000.235 
A review of this case shows that significantly lowering a 
punitive damages award in an environmental harm case can 
fulfill the purposes of punitive damages when the compensato-
ry damages award attempts to more fully value the actual and 
potential harm to the environment. In considering the state’s 
interest in protecting public resources, the court allowed com-
pensatory damages to include a significant portion of the envi-
ronmental harm. Because the compensatory damages award 
was so substantial, a lower ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages was appropriate.236 
Finally, no treatment of punitive damages and environ-
mental harm would be complete without a discussion of the Ex-
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1136. 
 231. Id. at 1137–38. 
 232. Id. at 1141–42. 
 233. Id. at 1150. 
 234. Id. at 1151. 
 235. Id. at 1152. 
 236. The court allowed the defendant’s wealth to be a consideration but not 
the basis for affirming the $1 billion punitive damages award. See id. at 1151. 
The evidence at trial included the fact that Exxon was the largest corporation 
in the world with assets of $251 billion, year 2000 revenues of $228.439 bil-
lion, and a year 2000 total net worth of $174 billion. Id. at 1150–51. 
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xon Valdez case.237 On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon 
Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, 
Alaska.238 The Exxon Corporation owned the tanker and em-
ployed Captain Joseph Hazelwood to command it on that 
day.239 Exxon knew both that Hazelwood was a relapsed alco-
holic and that he had been drinking leading up to the day in 
question.240 As a result of a combination of several events and 
conditions, including Hazelwood’s absence from the deck due to 
his inebriated state, the Exxon Valdez ran aground, resulting in 
the dispersal of an estimated eleven million gallons of crude oil 
into Prince William Sound.241 This release and the resulting 
environmental harm completely disrupted the largest commer-
cial and subsistence fishing operation in the nation, wreaked 
havoc on the community at large, and caused devastating dam-
age to the environment and ecosystem.242 It was arguably the 
largest environmental disaster in the nation’s history. 
The early phases of the resulting litigation and negotiation 
included payment of over $1 billion to local, state, tribal, and 
federal governments for environmental damages, and a jury 
award to a plaintiff class of commercial fishermen of over $500 
million in compensatory damages.243 In a later phase of the tri-
al, the jury awarded the fisherman plaintiff class $5 billion in 
punitive damages.244 The now eighteen-year litigation has 
spanned the Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW, State Farm, 
and the series of cases in between.245 The various appeals and 
remands focus, not surprisingly, on the constitutional due 
 
 237. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004), va-
cated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th 
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), 
cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 238. Id. at 1076. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1076–77. 
 241. Id. at 1077. 
 242. Id. at 1078. 
 243. Id. at 1078–80. 
 244. Id. at 1082. 
 245. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(“The resolution of punitive damages has been delayed because the course of 
this litigation has paralleled the course followed by the Supreme Court when, 
in 1991, it embarked on a series of decisions outlining the relationship of puni-
tive damages to the principles of due process embodied in our Constitution.”), 
amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 
2007) (No. 07-276). 
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process limit on the punitive damages award in this case. On 
the first remand, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Alaska applied the then-new BMW standard and re-
duced the punitive damages award to $4 billion.246 
In its most recent decision, the district court applied the 
State Farm standard and increased the allowable award to $4.5 
billion.247 The court’s analysis is extremely detailed and its dis-
cussion of the ratio element is instructive. First, the court rec-
ognized that the key issue was ensuring that the ratio analysis 
sufficiently considered the harm and potential harm caused by 
Exxon’s conduct.248 The court stated that it was “not restricted 
to the jury’s compensatory award in evaluating the ratio guide-
post” because the Supreme Court had indicated clearly that po-
tential harm must be considered, and that potential harm was 
“often not subject to precise calculation.”249 
With regard to actual harm, the court rejected Exxon’s ar-
gument that the compensatory damages figure, for purposes of 
applying the ratio test, could consist only of the compensatory 
damages actually awarded against Exxon ($20.3 million).250 In-
stead, the court found that the actual harm was $513,147,740, 
which included all amounts Exxon paid in connection with the 
spill to the plaintiffs, municipalities and villages, native corpo-
rations, and others directly affected by the spill.251 
In addition to these amounts, “there was purely non-
economic harm that cannot be quantified; there was harm 
which likely occurred but has not yet been valued; and there 
was potential harm—all flowing from the grounding of the Ex-
xon Valdez.”252 On the issue of potential harm, the court found 
there was no way of calculating how much additional harm 
would have resulted if the entire cargo of oil had spilled.253 
Thus, relying on BMW, the court determined that “the appro-
priate approach is to accommodate the unknowns by allowing a 
 
 246. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. Even though it re-
duced the award, it did so only upon the express direction of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit and stated that it still believed the original $5 bil-
lion punitive damages award was appropriate and constitutional. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1110. 
 248. Id. at 1098. 
 249. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 
(1993)). 
 250. Id. at 1099–1103. 
 251. Id. at 1101. 
 252. Id. at 1103. 
 253. Id. 
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higher ratio to pass constitutional muster.”254 Unlike in State 
Farm, where a portion of the award was for emotional distress 
and already contained a punitive element, the compensatory 
damages award in this case encompassed solely economic 
loss.255 Moreover, Exxon’s financial status justified a higher 
award in order to fulfill the appropriate punishment and deter-
rence objectives. Exxon’s treasurer had testified that “full pay-
ment of the judgment would not have a material impact on the 
corporation or its credit quality,”256 suggesting to the court “at 
least some evidence of the absence of over-deterrence.”257 
Based on its analysis, the court concluded that the original 
punitive damages award of $5 billion satisfied due process.258 
Because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ordered 
the district court to lower the award, however, it entered judg-
ment on punitive damages in the amount of $4.5 billion, a 9.74-
to-1 ratio.259 
The Ninth Circuit, however, again disapproved of the puni-
tive damages award, holding that due process limitations re-
quired a punitive damages award that was not more than five 
times the economic harm caused by the defendant, or $2.5 bil-
lion.260 The court emphasized, consistent with the district 
court’s analysis, that the punitive damages award could be 
based only on actual and potential economic harm to the plain-
tiffs and not on harm to public natural resources.261 It stated 
that “[w]e are precluded, as the jury was, from punishing Ex-
xon for befouling the beautiful region where the oil was spilled, 
because that punishment has already been imposed in separate 
litigation.”262 
The court then had two main issues to resolve: First, how 
to value the harm against which to compare the punitive dam-
ages award. Second, whether that award exceeded due process 
 
 254. Id. at 1104 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 
(1996)). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. at 1105. 
 257. Id. at 1105–06. 
 258. Id. at 1110. 
 259. Id. at 1106, 1110. 
 260. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602, 625 (9th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 
3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. 
Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 261. Id. at 601. 
 262. Id. 
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limits. On the issue of how to calculate the harm, the court 
agreed with the district court that, in addition to economic 
losses, the spill caused other “undeniable, if not easily quantifi-
able, harms,”263 and affirmed the district court’s conclusion as 
to that harm figure.264 The court then found, however, that a 
nearly 10-to-1 ratio violated due process requirements because 
the reprehensibility of the conduct, while “in the higher realm 
of reprehensibility,” was not “in the highest realm” and thus 
any ratio exceeding 5-to-1 was unconstitutional.265 
Here, both the district court and the court of appeals held 
decisively that the harm to the plaintiff was not limited to the 
compensatory damages award. Instead, the courts used all 
available figures to value economic losses and then concluded 
that even those figures did not adequately reflect the potential 
harm and harm that could not be or had not been translated in-
to monetary value.266 Thus, the court ensured that the ratio 
analysis encompassed total harm as completely as possible and 
did not limit the harm to solely the compensatory damages 
awarded at trial. 
The Exxon Valdez case is unique because of its scope. The 
disaster was massive, the harm was massive, Exxon’s wealth is 
massive, and the amount of valuation information available on 
economic loss and environmental harm is massive. The case is 
sui generis in many ways. Regardless of the unique nature of 
the case, it serves as a model of how courts can conduct a due 
process ratio evaluation carefully to ensure that there is a rec-
ognition (even if not a full valuation) of total harm. As shown in 
the cases above, simply comparing punitive damages and com-
 
 263. Id. at 618–19. 
 264. Id. at 619–23. Exxon argued that the measure of harm was only $20.3 
million because the court should subtract $493 million representing amounts 
paid to plaintiffs through Exxon’s voluntary claims program and other settle-
ments. Id. at 619. The only difference between the district court’s harm value 
and the court of appeals’ harm value was a $9 million overpayment that the 
court of appeals found the district court had overlooked and should not have 
been included in the final number. See id. at 623. 
 265. Id. at 618, 624. 
 266. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1103 (D. Alaska 
2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 
1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 
07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). The 
court did not include in its ratio analysis payments by Exxon to state and fed-
eral governments for natural resource damage that amounted to $900 million 
over ten years. Id. at 1078–79, 1099–1101; see In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 
F.3d at 601. 
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pensatory damages is insufficient and is not supported by ei-
ther BMW or State Farm. Instead, courts in environmental 
harm cases must consider all harm caused by the defendant, 
whether or not the plaintiff can actually recover such harm as 
compensatory damages. The next Section discusses existing 
roadblocks to assessing total harm in environmental cases and 
provides suggestions for surmounting them. 
C. EXPLORING STANDING AND VALUATION DIFFICULTIES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM CASES 
In the environmental harm cases, courts are able to place a 
monetary value either on the costs the plaintiff has spent to 
remediate the property or the diminution to the market value 
of the property as a result of the contamination.267 The court 
may also attempt to value harm to public natural resources 
when there is a plaintiff in the case with the right to recover for 
damage to natural resources. Very often though, standing doc-
trines and the difficulty of placing monetary values on natural 
resources prevent such valuation. 
Such standing and valuation restrictions limit significantly 
the ability to remedy environmental harm and to properly pu-
nish and deter environmental wrongdoing. Despite the vast ar-
ray of federal and state statutes imposing severe civil and crim-
inal penalties for polluting activities and violation of 
environmental standards,268 there is often less than optimal en-
forcement of such laws at both the federal and state levels.269 
 
 267. See Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1138–39 (La. Ct. App. 
1995), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); 
Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., No. CIV. A. CV 191-178, 1997 WL 
423108, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 9, 1997), vacated in part, 170 F.3d 1320 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
 268. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 948–49 (discussing the range of 
civil and criminal penalties for violating federal environmental standards, in-
cluding fines of up to $50,000 and three years in prison for knowing violations, 
and fines of up to $250,000 and fifteen years in prison for violations that kno-
wingly endanger another). 
 269. See TONY DUTZIK, COPIRG FOUND., THE STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT 22–26 (2002) (on file with author) (citing the lack of budget, 
staff, effective enforcement policies, political will, and accountability as rea-
sons why state governments have failed to effectively enforce environmental 
protection laws); Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resources Damages: 
Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851, 
873–76 (1989) (discussing enforcement problems as the result of limited fund-
ing and “institutional forces endemic to the way any large organization makes 
decisions”); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 115 (2005) (“It is a common view that during the past 
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Scholars, government officials, and others blame the underen-
forcement on the lack of effective enforcement policies, accoun-
tability, and political will; agency capture; and insufficient 
agency budgets and staff.270 While scholars disagree over 
whether these failures arise from public choice problems or 
other systemic deficiencies at the state or federal level,271 un-
derenforcement remains.272 In this situation, private actions 
brought to address environmental harm, such as common law 
suits and statutory citizen suits, can play a significant role in 
filling the enforcement gap. Congress, in trying to fulfill its 
long-standing goal of enhancing citizen enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws,273 has created citizen-suit provisions in most 
major federal environmental statutes in recognition of the fact 
that federal agencies will lack necessary resources (and some-
 
five years the environmental zeal of the federal executive branch has waned, 
resulting in fewer new or strengthened laws, fewer strengthened regulations, 
and less federal enforcement than one would have expected in a more pro-
environment administration.”). 
 270. See DUTZIK, supra note 269, at 22–26; PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AND POLICY 1027–28 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing Congress’s use of citi-
zen-suit provisions to address breakdowns in federal enforcement of environ-
mental laws because of a lack of resources and political pressure from the 
executive branch); Buzbee, supra note 269, at 121 (stating that growth-
oriented tax and labor policies, along with the impact of interest group pres-
sures, often lead state and local governments to underenforce existing laws 
and regulations). 
 271. Compare DUTZIK, supra note 269, at 22–26 (asserting that state en-
forcement of environmental laws fails because of a lack of budget, staff, effec-
tive enforcement policies, political will, and accountability), and Buzbee, supra 
note 269, at 121 (arguing that underenforcement of environmental statutes 
and regulations arises, in part, from inherent inertial forces and interest 
group pressures), with Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571–78 (2001) 
(rejecting the claim that federal environmental regulations arise out of the 
clash between environmental and business interests, and listing several alter-
native public choice accounts of environmental regulation). 
 272. Revesz, supra note 271, at 559 (addressing the causes of “underregula-
tion” of state environmental statutes); see Buzbee, supra note 269, at 121 (not-
ing the “temptation to fail to implement and enforce laws and regulations”). 
 273. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(“Congress intended citizen suits to both goad the responsible agencies to more 
vigorous enforcement of the anti-pollution standards and, if the agencies re-
mained inert, to provide an alternate enforcement mechanism.”); Gardeski v. 
Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating 
that the legislative history of the Clean Air Act suggests a “sensitive handling 
of citizen suits, that reflects Congress’s conviction that such suits can perform 
an indispensable function”). 
KLASS_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:36 AM 
128 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:83 
 
times will lack the political will) to address all statutory viola-
tions.274 
However, as discussed below,275 statutory citizen-suit pro-
visions have significant limitations, particularly in valuing and 
recovering damages for harm to natural resources. Common 
law public nuisance claims similarly suffer from standing limi-
tations that limit citizen efforts to seek redress for environ-
mental harm.276 These limitations suggest that a better ap-
proach, either in the form of legislative action, judicial action, 
or both, is needed to obtain appropriate punitive damages for 
environmental wrongdoing in cases where standing or valua-
tion limitations restrict recovery. 
1. Standing Limitations for Valuing Harm 
Many of the environmental harm cases involve claims of 
public or private nuisance. A public nuisance is an “unreasona-
ble” interference with a right common to the general public.277 
In many public nuisance cases, the plaintiff is a state or local 
government with presumptive standing to recover for harm to 
the public right.278 When the plaintiff is a private party, how-
ever, standing limitations apply.279 In order to recover damages 
in a private action for public nuisance, the plaintiff must have 
suffered a “special injury,” which the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts defines as “harm of a kind different from that suffered by 
 
 274. Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174–76 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (stating that the congressional purpose of the Clean Air Act’s citi-
zen-suit provision was to authorize citizens to act as private attorneys general 
because the Act’s sponsors were wary of federal environmental agencies’ lack 
of will and resources); PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 1027–28, 1033 (stat-
ing that, beginning in 1970, Congress included citizen-suit provisions in vir-
tually all the major environmental laws because it viewed such suits as an “ef-
ficient policy instrument” and a “participatory mechanism” at a time when 
limited resources or lack of political will made enforcement of environmental 
regulations difficult). 
 275. See infra notes 292–301 and accompanying text. 
 276. See infra notes 279–88 and accompanying text. 
 277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); id. § 821B(2) (listing 
the criteria for deciding if an interference is unreasonable). 
 278. See id. § 821C(2)(b) (stating that a public official or agency may 
represent the state or political subdivision in public nuisance actions). 
 279. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the 
Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 757–60 (2001) (ex-
plaining problems with the public nuisance doctrine that presently limit plain-
tiff standing to seek recovery for community-based social and environmental 
problems). 
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other members of the public.”280 In interpreting the special in-
jury requirement, courts have generally required that the 
plaintiff suffer an economically recognizable injury, such as in-
jury to person, profits, or land.281 
The requirement of a recognizable injury creates difficulty 
in environmental harm cases because damage to natural re-
sources, which does not result in a direct economic loss, does 
not constitute a recognizable injury for standing purposes. This 
difficulty is illustrated by another lawsuit flowing from the Ex-
xon Valdez spill, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a class of Alaskan Natives could not bring a pub-
lic nuisance action to recover for harm to their subsistence way 
of life.282 Their way of life was described as “dependent upon 
the preservation of uncontaminated natural resources, marine 
life and wildlife” reflecting “a personal, economic psychological, 
social, cultural, communal and religious form of daily living.”283 
In affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the action, the court 
of appeals agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs’ 
noneconomic subsistence claims were not “different in kind” 
from those suffered by other members of the public, although 
they “potentially might be different in degree.”284 The court 
noted that the plaintiffs received compensation for their eco-
nomic loss claims associated with the spill in an earlier settle-
ment, and that the law could not value the remaining claims of 
noneconomic injury.285 
As a result of the court’s conclusions, the plaintiffs’ remedy 
could be no more than the benefit they, along with other 
Alaskans, received from the substantial payments Exxon made 
to local, state, and federal governments for environmental res-
toration.286 In this case, because federal, state, and local gov-
 
 280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979). 
 281. See MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 28, at 66–78 (listing cases in 
which plaintiffs who suffered personal injury, or whose privately-owned land 
or chattels were harmed, met the special injury requirement). 
 282. In re The Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 283. Id. at 1197. 
 284. Id. at 1198. 
 285. Id. at 1197–98; see In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 
WL 182856, at *3 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims be-
cause they sought a recovery of nonmarket claims of cultural damage which 
was “not founded” on any legal theory recognized by maritime law), aff ’d, 104 
F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 286. In re The Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d at 1198 (noting that any claims aris-
ing out of damage to the Natives’ subsistence way of life “miss the mark” be-
cause the right to a subsistence way of life is “shared by all Alaskans”). 
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ernments had already recovered $1 billion in connection with 
environmental harm, the plaintiffs were not acting to fill a 
“gap” in enforcement of environmental protection laws.287 In 
many cases, however, significant environmental harm occurs, 
and no state or federal plaintiff is willing or able to seek recov-
ery, leaving private tort actions as the only practical means of 
attempting to value and recover for damages to natural re-
sources.288 As a result, the decision has a potentially significant 
and adverse impact on other private party actions where the 
plaintiff has not suffered a direct pecuniary loss. 
The standing limitations that hinder full use by environ-
mental plaintiffs’ of public nuisance claims apply equally to 
private nuisance claims, but for different reasons. A private 
nuisance is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in 
the private use and enjoyment of land.”289 Because the plaintiff 
seeks recovery for interference with land the plaintiff owns ra-
ther than a public right, the problem is less one of standing 
than of remedy. A defendant is liable for private nuisance if his 
or her conduct causes the invasion, and the invasion is (1) in-
tentional and unreasonable; or (2) unintentional and negligent, 
reckless, or subject to strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities or conditions.290 Because the interest the plaintiff 
seeks to protect is the violation of the plaintiff ’s use and en-
joyment of land, the remedy generally consists of the damages 
measured by the diminution in value or restoration costs.291 
 
 287. See supra notes 268–74 and accompanying text (discussing the role 
private lawsuits play in filling federal and state enforcement gaps). 
 288. See Kirstin H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism 
in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 167, 180–81 (2006) (discussing the 
federal government’s failure to address “environmental issues posing inter-
state externalities” and its current “deregulatory and passive approach toward 
environmental regulation”); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Prin-
ciples: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
699, 749 n.280 (2006) (citing authorities that discuss the failure of the federal 
government to enforce existing environmental regulations and its decision not 
to enact new regulations to address growing environmental problems). For an 
analysis of the problem of underenforcement of federal and state environmen-
tal statutes, see supra notes 268–72 and accompanying text. For a discussion 
of the difficulties states have in valuing damages to natural resources, see in-
fra Part III.C.2. 
 289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). 
 290. Id. § 822. 
 291. See id. § 929(1)(a); see also Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 
1139–42 (La. Ct. App. 1995), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 
127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007). The Grefer decision discussed earlier remains unusual, 
however, in that the plaintiff recovered restoration costs without first incur-
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Thus, private nuisance claims do not provide a vehicle for 
plaintiffs to recover for damage to natural resources that can-
not be translated into an economic loss borne by the plaintiff. 
Beyond the common law claims just discussed, even federal 
statutes enacted for environmental protection purposes have 
significant standing limitations. The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) all 
contain provisions under which federal and state governments 
and Indian tribes can recover for damage to natural re-
sources.292 For instance, CERCLA imposes liability for the re-
lease of a hazardous substance that causes “damages for injury 
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,”293 including the 
reasonable cost of assessing such loss or injury.294 The OPA 
contains a similar provision in the case of oil discharges, and 
specifically describes the measure of damage for natural re-
sources as the sum of (1) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, 
replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged natural 
resources; (2) the diminution in value of those natural re-
sources pending restoration; and (3) the reasonable cost of as-
sessing those damages.295 Private parties and local govern-
ments, however, cannot recover for natural resource damages 
under any of these laws. Instead, the statutes limit their recov-
 
ring those costs or obtaining government approval for a remediation plan, and 
because the restoration costs significantly exceeded the value of the property. 
See id. at 1141 (allowing recovery of $56 million in restoration costs even 
though market value of the property was $1.5 million and the court could not 
force the plaintiff to use the money for a cleanup). For a discussion of cases 
that measure harm to land from past invasions, see MADDEN & BOSTON, supra 
note 28, at 255–70. 
 292. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f )(4) (2000) (listing a provision of the Clean Water 
Act allowing for the recovery of costs of removal for oil or hazardous substance 
from navigable waters and other related areas, including any costs or ex-
penses incurred “in the restoration or replacement of natural resources dam-
aged or destroyed”); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C), 
9607(f ) (2000) (containing CERCLA provisions allowing recovery for natural 
resource damages caused by the release of a hazardous substance). 
 293. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000). CERCLA defines “natural resources” 
as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water sup-
plies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, ap-
pertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States[,] . . .  any State or 
local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such re-
sources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an In-
dian tribe.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). 
 294. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). 
 295. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d). 
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ery to the costs incurred in investigating and remediating the 
harm caused by the release of hazardous substances.296 
Moreover, although state and federal governments recov-
ered $1 billion in compensation for natural resource damages in 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill,297 claims for natural resource dam-
ages remain far less frequent than claims to recover cleanup 
costs.298 Indeed, many argue that existing provisions allowing 
recovery for damage to natural resources are significantly un-
derutilized.299 This is due, in large part, to the difficulty of val-
uing such damages and the failure of federal agencies to prom-
 
 296. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). 
 297. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Alaska 
2004) (discussing the settlement between Exxon, the United States, and the 
State of Alaska for damages to natural resources), vacated per curiam, 472 
F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 298. James P. Power, Reinvigorating Natural Resource Damage Actions 
Through the Public Trust Doctrine, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 418, 448 (1995) (con-
cluding that the CERCLA natural resource damage provision has “enormous 
potential” for recovery of damages, but that the actual experience has been 
disappointing with only fifty suits brought since 1980 and only two suits that 
have gone to trial); see AMY W. ANDO ET AL., ILL. WASTE MGMT. & RESEARCH 
CTR., NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: METHODS AND CASES 2 
(2004), available at http://www.wmrc.uiuc.edu/main_sections/info_services/ 
library_docs/RR/RR108.pdf (discussing the various statutes that allow recov-
ery of natural resource damage, but detailing the difficulty states face in 
bringing actions upon such statutes and developing valuation techniques to 
conduct damage assessments). But see N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mo-
bil Corp., 923 A.2d 345, 354 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding as a mat-
ter of first impression that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control 
Act’s definition of “cleanup and removal costs” gives the state the right to re-
cover for the “loss of use” of natural resources injured or destroyed by an illeg-
al discharge, in addition to the costs of physical restoration). 
 299. Breen, supra note 269, at 867–68 (stating that the experience with 
natural resource damage claims as of 1989 “is largely one of missed opportuni-
ties” with relatively few federal or state claims filed); Gordon Johnson, Deputy 
Bureau Chief, Envtl. Prot. Bureau, Office of N.Y. Attorney Gen., Address at 
the Columbia Law School Symposium: The Role of State Attorneys General in 
National Environmental Policy (Sept. 20, 2004), in 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
461, 462–63 (2003) (expressing concern that damages associated with smaller 
spills, while frequent, often are not pursued by states because of the time and 
money required to bring such lawsuits). But see Gerald F. George, Litigation of 
Claims for Natural Resource Damages, SE98 ALI-ABA 397, 399 & n.2 (2000) 
(Westlaw) (stating that claims for natural resource damage under CERCLA 
have become “commonplace” with sixty-seven claims resolved by the federal 
government as of 1996 for payments totaling over $135 million, but noting 
that few claims have gone to trial, resulting in little case law). 
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ulgate regulations to help in the valuation process.300 In 
tion, the statutory prohibition on local government suits for 
natural resource damages precludes recovery by those govern-
mental entities closest to the problem.301 
The various limitations on standing and available remedies 
mean that, in a private party tort action to recover for envi-
ronmental harm, the compensatory damages rarely will value 
fully the harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct. This lack 
of full valuation is a major gap in the punitive damages frame-
work because many cases involving significant environmental 
harm do not have the benefit of a government plaintiff with 
standing to sue for the full scope of damages to environmental 
resources. Thus, it is important that plaintiffs be able to utilize 
private lawsuits as a means of advancing valuation tech-
niques.302 Such private lawsuits are consistent with the federal 
environmental law framework. Most of the major federal envi-
ronmental statutes have explicit savings clauses, showing Con-
gress’s intent to allow private citizens to continue to utilize the 
common law to seek relief for environmental harm.303 
 
 300. See ANDO ET AL., supra note 298, at 2; PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, 
at 942–44 (discussing disagreements between government agencies and 
stakeholders on how to value natural resource damages and the general un-
certainty in this area of the law); Dale Thompson, Valuing the Environment: 
Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57, 58–61 
(2002) (detailing difficulties in valuing natural resource damages). 
 301. See Michael J. Wittke, Comment, Municipal Recovery of Natural Re-
source Damages Under CERCLA, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 921, 941–43 
(1996) (arguing that local governments should be given standing to sue for 
natural resource damages under CERCLA and that “[i]t is the extraordinary 
case, such as the Exxon Valdez disaster, that warrants widespread notice and 
action” leading to federal and state government involvement). 
 302. See Antolini, supra note 279, at 757–60 (discussing the interest of 
scholars and practitioners in reinvigorating private party actions and common 
law remedies to address the lack of federal enforcement of environmental 
laws); Breen, supra note 269, at 874–76 (stating that the government appara-
tus for bringing enforcement actions is cumbersome and subject to significant 
budget restrictions and arguing that citizen suits for natural resource damag-
es would result in substantial gains in both environmental compliance and re-
covery of natural resource damages); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and 
Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 579–80 
(2007) (discussing the lack of federal enforcement of environmental law and 
the need for an increased role by state governments, local governments, and 
private parties in environmental protection efforts). 
 303. See Klass, supra note 302, at 570 & n.143 (citing savings clauses in 
federal environmental statutes and numerous cases interpreting savings 
clauses to allow for common law claims to enjoin environmental harm and ob-
tain damages for such harm). 
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2. Valuation Limitations 
Beyond standing problems, valuation problems also impede 
a full assessment of environmental harm. Valuation difficulties 
exist even in cases where a federal or state government plain-
tiff can recover for natural resource damages under statutory 
or common law theories. While claims for direct property losses 
and diminution in market value can be quantified fairly easily, 
natural resources have values that are not yet fully captured in 
the market system.304 What is the value of a seal? Of a bird? Of 
a day at the beach? Of the ability to prevent another Exxon 
Valdez disaster in the future?305 
Scholars have created “use values,” which assign an attri-
buted market value to things not traded in the marketplace in 
an attempt to capture their value.306 “Consumptive value” 
attributes a value to lost-resource uses by sportsmen or tourists 
who, but for the harm to the resource, would have taken wild-
life in hunting or fishing pursuits.307 “Nonconsumptive use” re-
fers to the ecosystem’s value to photographers, bird watchers, 
and others who gain appreciation from nature.308 These non-
consumptive uses include an “existence value”—the amount a 
person is willing to pay to know that the resource is there, even 
if they do not yet actively use or enjoy it.309 Such uses also in-
 
 304. Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462–64 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (“From the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural re-
sources have values that are not fully captured by the market system. . . . Op-
tion and existence values may represent ‘passive’ use, but they nonetheless 
reflect utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus, prima facie, ought 
to be included in a damage assessment.”) (citations omitted); PLATER ET AL., 
supra note 270, at 183–94 (discussing the difficulty of valuing natural re-
sources). 
 305. See Lisa Heinzerling, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 
Address at the Columbia Law School Symposium: The Role of State Attorneys 
General in National Environmental Policy (Sept. 20, 2004), in 30 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 449, 454–56 (2005) (discussing efforts to value the loss of natural 
resources, including the use of contingent valuation surveys); Thompson, su-
pra note 300, at 58–61(discussing the difficulties of valuing nonmarket com-
modities such as natural resources and problems with the Contingent Valua-
tion Method (CVM) of calculating “nonuse values” in natural resource 
damages cases). 
 306. PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 188. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 476 n.73 (explaining existence value); James 
Peck, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natu-
ral Resources Damages, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 279–81 (1999) (dis-
cussing methods of valuation, including a biocentric approach (as opposed to 
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clude an “option value,” which measures how much a person 
would to pay to reserve the option to use that resource in the 
future.310 
Scholars have developed economic methods for estimating 
some of these values. Each of the various methods creates a 
hypothetical human market for resources.311 For example, the 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) sets up “hypothetical 
markets to elicit an individual’s economic valuation of a natural 
resource.”312 CVM employs interviews and surveys with indi-
viduals to arrive at a “willing to pay” value for resources.313 As 
early as 1989, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ap-
proved the use of CVM for ascertaining use and option values of 
resources in state and federal natural resource damages ac-
tions.314 
A second method that attempts to quantify the value of en-
vironmental resources is the growing field of “ecosystem servic-
es.”315 Ecosystems are a key component of our natural capital, 
but historically society has not assigned them a monetary value 
because they are “free.”316 A growing body of literature presents 
the case for valuing and thus increasing protection for natural 
resources such as wetlands, diverse plant and animal species, 
healthy forests, and clean air.317 This framework attempts to 
 
an anthropocentric approach) which recognizes the intrinsic value of natural 
resources independent of human satisfactions). 
 310. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 475 n.72. 
 311. PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 188. 
 312. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 475 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1988)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 313. Id. 
 314. See id. at 476–79 (sustaining Department of the Interior regulations 
relying on CVM for calculating option and use values). 
 315. Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in 
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3 
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (defining ecosystem services as “the conditions 
and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make 
them up, sustain and fulfill human life”). Ecosystem services support “ecosys-
tem goods” such a seafood, forage, timber, biomass fuels, natural fiber, and 
pharmaceutical and industrial products. Id. 
 316. See Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosys-
tem Service Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 341 (2001). 
 317. See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes 
from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 871–77 (2005) (discussing developments 
in research on ecosystem services and reviewing initiatives around the world 
which have sought to create markets for natural capital); James Salzman & 
J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 607, 609–16 (2000) (analyzing environmental trading markets 
(ETMs) such as wetland banking programs, air pollution trading programs, 
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provide a mechanism to capture the value of ecosystem services 
as well as quantify and promote service values.318 
CVM and ecosystem services, however, have yet to make 
their way into common legal parlance, and natural resource 
damage continues to be less-than-fully valued in many law-
suits.319 As a result, even the most obvious vehicle for recover-
ing harm to natural resources—CERCLA’s natural resource 
damage provision—arguably remains a “sleeping giant.”320 Sig-
nificant confusion persists regarding the appropriate measure 
of damages in environmental harm claims and neither state 
nor federal governments have made frequent efforts to recover 
for such harm, even though they regularly seek out-of-pocket 
remediation costs.321 Indeed, the Exxon Valdez case, where Ex-
xon agreed to pay state and federal governments approximately 
$1 billion for “environmental damage,” remains an anomaly.322 
As scholars have recognized, “[t]he subtle relationship between 
environmental systems and the uses provided by the systems 
. . . is not readily grasped by the relative crudeness of the legal 
system.”323 This results in an inability to easily convert damag-
es to, and loss of use of public environmental assets into, a 
monetary damages award. The controversy surrounding CVM, 
reflected in scholarly writing supporting and criticizing CVM, 
shows that it remains a challenge to value natural resources in 
the context of civil litigation.324 
 
and species habitat programs, and suggesting that modifications to such pro-
grams would better capture the value of nonfungible resources). See generally 
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra 
note 315 (containing a collection of articles on economic and ecological issues 
surrounding ecosystem services). 
 318. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Ser-
vices: Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SO-
CIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 315, at 23, 33–35 
(discussing methods for valuing nonuse and nonconsumptive values from eco-
systems). 
 319. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 320. PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 942. 
 321. See id. at 942–45 (discussing CERCLA remedies). 
 322. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Alaska 
2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 
1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 
07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 323. Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology 
in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 
89 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1995). 
 324. Compare id. at 1030–31 & n.8, 1032–34 (criticizing the use of CVM in 
natural resource damage assessments and citing to recent economic litera-
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In many ways, the difficulty of valuing environmental 
harm is similar to the difficulty of valuing other forms of non-
economic harm. As one court has stated, damages for nonpecu-
niary injury such as pain and suffering, loss of life, and loss of 
enjoyment of life is based on a “legal fiction” that the courts ac-
cept, “knowing that although money will neither ease the pain 
nor restore the victim’s abilities, this device is as close as the 
law can come in its effort to right the wrong.”325 For decades 
now, the legal system has allowed juries to award damages for 
pain and suffering, loss of life, and other nonpecuniary injury 
despite the valuation difficulties.326 Thus, as a practical matter, 
significant changes in legal doctrine are not required to allow 
recovery for natural resource damages and loss of ecosystem 
services, at least in cases where standing hurdles are not at is-
sue.327 Indeed, there is much less of a “legal fiction” involved in 
awarding damages for natural resource harm than for pain and 
suffering because natural resource damages can be tied directly 
to remediating the harm. What is required is a greater willing-
ness by current government plaintiffs and private plaintiffs 
with sufficient standing to seek such damages, and for courts to 
be open to awarding such damages with greater frequency.  
In sum, these standing and valuation limitations highlight 
the difficulty of recognizing and awarding damages for envi-
ronmental harm, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a private 
party or a government entity, or whether the claim is one under 
common law or statute. Under these circumstances, harm to 
the environment regularly goes unvalued or undervalued, and 
 
ture), with Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 269, 285–92 (1989) (discussing the nonuse values of natural resources), 
Dobbins, supra note 97, at 944–46 (arguing that CVM should be utilized to 
quantify natural resource nonuse values and comparing the valuation process 
to that for nonpecuniary losses such as pain and suffering), and Judith Robin-
son, Note, The Role of Nonuse Values in Natural Resource Damages: Past, 
Present, and Future, 75 TEX. L. REV. 189, 213 (1996) (concluding that CVM 
“provides the best available method for quantifying nonuse values; despite the 
intangible nature of the injuries”). 
 325. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989). 
 326. See Geistfeld, supra note 136, at 1106 (“The absence of well-defined 
standards for determining pain and suffering damages is well known.”); see 
also Jennifer H. Arlen, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for 
Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1985) (“[C]urrent wrongful 
death damage rules, which base recovery . . . on the future income of the vic-
tim, are not efficient[, but] it is not possible to design efficient damages rules 
to govern recovery for loss of life.”); supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 327. See, e.g., J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SER-
VICES 266–71 (2007). 
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wrongdoers go unpunished or underpunished, similar to the 
problem of the undervaluation of harm that exists in the inten-
tional tort cases discussed in Section III.A. The next Section 
further explores the problems of undervaluation of environ-
mental harm by comparing environmental harm cases to the 
intentional tort cases, and addresses the methods courts have 
used in the intentional torts cases to address valuation difficul-
ties. 
D. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE INTENTIONAL TORT AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM CASES 
This Section more closely compares the intentional tort 
cases and environmental harm cases to explore why courts 
have often taken such different approaches to the two types of 
cases. While there are significant differences between the in-
tentional tort and environmental harm cases for purposes of 
punitive damages, there are important similarities as well. 
First, the differences. There is no question that the absolute 
dollar amounts of both compensatory damages and punitive 
damages are far smaller in the intentional tort cases.328 State 
Farm and BMW both state clearly that when an egregious act 
has resulted in a small amount of economic damage, a higher 
ratio of punitive damages may be appropriate.329 
As discussed above, courts have no difficulty recognizing 
these cases as ones in which significantly larger punitive dam-
ages awards are necessary to punish the defendant for miscon-
duct and deter the defendant and others from engaging in simi-
lar misconduct in the future.330 Recognizing that the single-
digit ratio has little role in these cases, courts defer to the jury’s 
assessment of the punitive damages award necessary to fulfill 
the purposes of punitive damages based on applicable state law 
factors.331 Furthermore, lower courts realize that the purpose of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is to reign in 
multimillion dollar and billion dollar punitive damages 
awards.332 Civil rights, defamation, and trespass cases do not 
fit that model, giving lower courts more discretion to “do jus-
tice” and use punitive damages to serve as a form of redress 
 
 328. See supra Part III.A. 
 329. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). 
 330. See supra Part III.A. 
 331. See supra Part III.A. 
 332. See supra Part III.A. 
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within substantive due process limitations. 
Unlike the small awards in intentional tort cases, the envi-
ronmental harm cases often involve significant compensatory 
damages and punitive damages awards.333 In addition, the 
awards in these cases attract attention, as they appear at first 
glance to be precisely those the Court attempted to “rein in” 
with the introduction of its single-digit ratio presumption.334 
However, as the Exxon Valdez case illustrates, the presence of 
a large, multinational corporate defendant tempers the mas-
siveness of an award for several reasons. First, a more substan-
tial punitive damages award is required to punish and deter 
the conduct of a large company, which possesses more financial 
resources than an individual or a small corporate defendant. In 
reviewing the punitive damages awarded by the jury, the Ex-
xon Valdez court found that “[w]hat is sufficient to effect just 
but not excessive deterrence of Captain Hazelwood, and what is 
sufficient to effect just and not excessive deterrence of the Ex-
xon defendants are vastly different.”335 
Although the Supreme Court warned in State Farm that 
“[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise un-
constitutional punitive damages award,”336 the Court has never 
rejected the use of wealth as a factor, and has confirmed the 
appropriateness of its use in prior cases.337 Numerous state 
courts direct juries to consider wealth as a factor in setting a 
punitive damages award,338 which is consistent with the ap-
 
 333. See supra Part III.A. 
 334. See infra notes 385–86 and accompanying text (discussing some scho-
lars’ use of the term “environmental torts” to refer to toxic tort cases with sig-
nificant nonpecuniary damages and their arguments that such cases are in 
particular need of punitive damage reform); see also supra Part II.B (discuss-
ing the types of cases driving the Supreme Court’s constitutional restrictions 
on punitive damages). 
 335. In re The Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1065 (D. Alaska. 2002), 
amended by 296 F.Supp.2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated per curiam, 472 
F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 336. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003). 
 337. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 
n.28 (1993) (stating that it is “well-settled law” that the net worth of the de-
fendant can be considered in setting punitive damages); see also supra note 42 
(discussing the validity of using the defendant’s wealth in assessing punitive 
damages). 
 338. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing factors state 
courts direct juries to use when setting punitive damages). 
KLASS_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:36 AM 
140 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:83 
 
proach in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.339 Thus, simply be-
cause the amount of punitive damages awarded in environmen-
tal harm cases is larger than those in many of the intentional 
tort cases does not mean courts should mechanically reduce 
jury awards in such cases. 
Second, and more importantly, large companies have the 
potential to cause damage on a far greater scale. These are 
companies in a position to spill fifty-three million gallons of oil 
into one of the most treasured natural environments in the na-
tion.340 These are companies whose scope of operations make 
them capable of contaminating land with high levels of radioac-
tive material.341 These are companies whose operations create 
the potential for serious contamination of public drinking-water 
supplies.342 In short, such cases involve companies who, as a 
result of their size and power, have the ability to cause harm on 
a scope not possible for many other defendants. For example, 
while the BMW owners experienced distress upon discovering 
their cars were repainted without their knowledge, that dis-
tress simply did not compare to the mental distress suffered by 
those people who had “to change the way they make their liv-
ing” as a result of the Exxon spill.343 Thus, while the awards in 
the environmental harm cases are large enough to raise eye-
brows, the corporate defendants’ wealth and the scope of harm 
they caused in these cases render the awards just as appropri-
ate as the smaller amounts awarded against smaller and less 
 
 339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (stating that the trier 
of fact may consider the means of the defendant). 
 340. The Exxon Valdez was carrying 53 million gallons of oil when it ran 
aground on Bligh Reef. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077–
78 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), 
amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 
3073 (U.S. Aug. 20, 2007) (No. 07-219), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 
3082 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2007) (No. 07-276). Experts estimated that 11 million gal-
lons were discharged in the grounding of the ship, but had Captain Hazelwood 
succeeded in his efforts to back the ship off Bligh Reef, significantly more 
oil―perhaps the entire cargo―would have spilled. Id. 
 341. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1123–26 (La. Ct. App. 
2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); 
see supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 342. City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Dow Chem. Co., Nos. 999345, 
999643, 2006 WL 2346275, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2006); supra notes 
193–94 and accompanying text. 
 343. In re The Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
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wealthy defendants in the intentional trespass and defamation 
cases. 
Despite the difference in the size of awards, in both types 
of cases the harm the defendant caused does not fully translate 
into compensatory damages. In many of the intentional tort 
cases, no compensatory damages are available. This inability to 
recover results from the failure of the civil justice system to 
provide monetary relief for an individual’s right to exclude oth-
ers from his or her property or person.344 The failure of com-
pensatory damages to account for all of the harm the defendant 
causes is easy to see in intentional torts cases, when damages 
are often nominal. However, in the environmental harm cases, 
where damages often total millions of dollars, this gap is not so 
easy to see. Courts are able to place a monetary value on the 
harm as either costs the plaintiff has incurred in restoring 
property or as diminution in the fair market value of the prop-
erty as a result of contamination. Courts sometimes attempt to 
value harm to natural resources when a plaintiff who has the 
right to recover damages for such harm is present in the case. 
More often, though, standing doctrines and the difficulty of as-
signing a monetary value to natural resources prevents valuing 
the harm the defendant has caused to natural resources. 
In sum, both the intentional tort and environmental harm 
cases involve harm for which the judicial system has difficulty 
setting an economic value, resulting in no, or only partial, val-
uation of the harm caused by the defendant. Because the dam-
age amounts are so great in environmental harm cases, courts 
struggle to identify the significant harm that remains unval-
ued. By contrast, courts in intentional tort cases easily recog-
nize the undervaluation and can award punitive damages to 
correct the undervaluation without due process limitations. 
Part IV offers a framework to address the problem of valuation 
for punitive damages purposes in both types of cases. 
 
 344. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 306 (1965) (requiring a plain-
tiff to suffer illness or other “bodily harm” to recover for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress); id. § 46 (requiring a plaintiff to suffer “bodily harm” in 
connection with emotional distress to recover for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress against a defendant); JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS 
PROCESS 667–76 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the development of the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress); see also supra notes 139–54 (discuss-
ing courts’ use of punitive damages as a substitute for the inability to compen-
sate for invasions of person or property). 
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IV.  VALUING HARM AND APPLYING RATIOS   
This Part introduces the beginning of a framework for 
awarding punitive damages that helps courts more fully recog-
nize total harm and concludes with some suggestions for poten-
tial legislative and judicial initiatives that may help alleviate 
concerns that a full valuation of harm will result in “windfall” 
punitive damages to plaintiffs in environmental harm cases. 
First, intentional tort cases and environmental harm cases 
require different frameworks. Even though an undervaluation 
of harm exists in both types of cases, in the intentional tort 
cases the unvalued harm is still personal to the plaintiff—it is 
the plaintiff ’s right to exclude or to personal integrity that has 
been violated. As a result, it seems appropriate to award any 
increase in punitive damages to the plaintiff. The punitive 
damages substitute for the compensation of the personal right 
violation that goes unvalued in the case, just as punitive dam-
ages awards substituted for unrecoverable emotional harm in 
earlier cases.345 There is little concern regarding plaintiff 
“windfalls” in these cases. The total awards are modest, and 
punishment and deterrence objectives suggest that in these of-
ten interpersonal disputes where no third-party interests or 
public resources are involved, the plaintiff herself should re-
ceive the award.346 
The same is not true in the environmental harm cases. If 
the court values harm to natural resources beyond the plain-
tiff ’s direct economic loss, it is not so clear that the court 
should award the plaintiff the increased punitive damages 
representing the full valuation of harm. If the punitive damag-
es are based on harm to resources “owned” by the public in-
stead of the plaintiff, the public should receive the portion of 
the punitive damages award reflecting the harm to public re-
sources, minus some amount awarded to the plaintiff as an in-
centive for bringing the suit. These proposals are discussed be-
low. 
 
 345. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 
424, 437 n.11 (2001). 
 346. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 136, at 1097–98 (2005) (stating that the 
punitive damages in cases involving the violation of a plaintiff ’s individual 
rights punish the wrong to the plaintiff rather than to society, resulting in no 
overlap with any related criminal penalties and thus not raising an issue of 
“double punishment”). 
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A. AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN INTENTIONAL TORT CASES 
WITH SMALL OR NOMINAL DAMAGES 
Intentional tort cases, such as defamation, trespass, and 
civil rights violations, are cases where all or a large portion of 
the harm goes unvalued as compensatory damages and the 
harm is focused on the individual plaintiff. As shown above, 
courts are able to conduct a full due process analysis without 
adhering to single-digit ratios. Although courts often reduce the 
amount of punitive damages, these reductions are invariably 
based not on any ratio requirement, but instead on the repre-
hensibility of conduct, the financial status of the defendant, the 
purposes of punitive damages, and other state statutory fac-
tors.347 Importantly, the courts recognize that a consideration 
of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not helpful 
in the analysis because compensatory damages do not 
represent the harm the defendant caused. Though courts do not 
attempt to place a dollar amount on the harm that goes unval-
ued, their recognition of its existence justifies disregarding the 
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. As a result, 
courts implicitly allow punitive damages to serve a compensa-
tory role, in addition to fulfilling punitive and deterrent pur-
poses. In these cases, it seems perfectly appropriate that the 
plaintiff be the beneficiary of the punitive damages award. 
Based on the unique characteristics of intentional tort cas-
es, the best approach appears to be as follows. First, courts 
should continue to recognize, as they generally do, that the sin-
gle-digit ratio should not apply to small or nominal damages in 
intentional tort cases. Courts also should recognize, though, 
that it is not that there is no actual harm in these cases, but 
only that the civil justice system does not value the harm re-
sulting from an invasion of personal or property rights. Courts 
need not attempt to actually measure that harm, although 
there is nothing that prevents them from attempting to do 
so.348 Instead, they should recognize expressly that such harm 
exists and, after applying BMW and State Farm, affirm those 
awards that exceed a single-digit ratio. In sum, courts should 
continue to use the approach laid out by many courts already, 
 
 347. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing factors for puni-
tive damages). 
 348. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text (discussing and criti-
quing existing and historical standards for recovery of damages). 
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with the addition of an explicit recognition of the nature of the 
plaintiff ’s unvalued harm. 
B. AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 
CASES 
As discussed above, environmental harm cases require a 
framework different than intentional tort cases. First, one poss-
ible approach would be to relax standing requirements to allow 
private parties to bring public nuisance and statutory claims. 
These actions could result in quantifying environmental harm 
using restoration costs and the natural resource valuation 
techniques discussed earlier,349 even if the plaintiff would not 
be responsible financially for the restoration. Under this ap-
proach, single-digit ratios of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages would be appropriate because compensatory damages 
would include the total value of harm. 
Another possible approach would be to abandon the single-
digit ratio presumption and follow the analysis courts have 
used in intentional tort cases. Under such an approach, courts 
would recognize harm occurred but remains unvalued as dam-
ages, and would use the flexible standards in BMW and State 
Farm to depart from single-digit ratios when harm is difficult 
to value.350 This approach involves far less precision than the 
first. However, it may be more realistic to implement, at least 
in the short term, as it does not require major changes to exist-
ing standing doctrines. This approach must address directly the 
Court’s recent decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, which 
limits the plaintiff ’s ability to rely on harm to nonparties (here, 
harm to public natural resources) in seeking punitive damag-
es.351 As shown below, this concern is significantly lessened by 
the place-based nature of environmental harm. This is in con-
trast to products liability claims, toxic tort claims to recover for 
personal injury, and other types of claims based on nationwide 
conduct. 
Finally, under both the approaches to valuing harm in en-
vironmental cases outlined here, the problem arises that the 
harm (whether valued monetarily or not) is not “personal” to 
the plaintiff as it is in the intentional tort cases. Instead, the 
private plaintiff is attempting to recover for harm to natural 
 
 349. See supra notes 306–14 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 351. See 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007). 
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resources owned or managed by the public, in addition to his or 
her own pecuniary loss. Therefore, even if obstacles to private 
party standing and valuation are removed, it does not follow 
that the plaintiff should be the beneficiary of all the now-
increased punitive damages that flow from the public harm. As 
a result, there must be a method of apportioning the award of 
punitive damages between the private party plaintiff and the 
federal, state, or local government responsible for the resource. 
Each of these approaches and concerns are discussed below. 
1. Valuing Environmental Harm in the Absence of a State or 
Federal Government Plaintiff 
As the cases discussed in earlier Parts show, attempting to 
value environmental harm is difficult.352 In some cases, howev-
er, valuation of harm is at least possible because a state or fed-
eral government, whether a plaintiff or not, has attempted to 
value the harm through restoration costs or other economic in-
dicators. Valuation should become more sophisticated as quan-
tification of nonuse values for natural resources develops 
through further refinement of CVM or new methods of valua-
tion.353 As that happens, existence and option values of natural 
resources can and should be added to restoration costs to value 
total harm.354 In the meantime, courts should consider restora-
tion costs in measuring total harm for purposes of reviewing 
punitive damages awards, even if the court finds it inappro-
priate to award such costs to a private or local government 
plaintiff as compensatory damages. 
Private plaintiffs can enhance valuation techniques more 
directly if legislatures expand qui tam provisions that are part 
of federal and state false claims acts to supplement government 
efforts to value and recover for environmental harm. Qui tam 
provisions currently allow private parties to sue on behalf of 
the federal or state government to recover stolen government 
funds after giving notice of the suit to the government.355 As an 
 
 352. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 353. See supra notes 311–14 (discussing CVM for assessing nonuse values). 
 354. See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345, 
401, 409–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding as a matter of first im-
pression that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act’s definition 
of “cleanup and removal costs” gives the state the right to recover for “loss of 
use” of natural resources injured or destroyed by a discharge in addition to the 
costs of physical restoration). 
 355. Aaron R. Petty, Note, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Cor-
ruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851, 863–70 (2006) (discussing history and 
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incentive for private parties to bring such suits, this legislation 
directs courts to award private plaintiffs between fifteen and 
thirty percent of the funds recovered.356 The purpose of such 
laws is to allow private attorneys general to supplement the 
governments’ effort to combat fraud.357 
State legislatures could enact statutes that similarly allow 
private citizens to bring qui tam suits for conduct that violates 
state or federal law and results in harm to the environment. 
The legislation would allow the plaintiff to seek restoration 
costs and/or loss of use damages based on CVM and other  
methods. In addition, the legislation could provide for a split in 
the recovery of any punitive damages, with the majority going 
to the state and some portion going to the private plaintiff as 
an incentive for bringing the lawsuit.358 
Qui tam and split-recovery legislation would enhance the 
citizen-suit provisions that exist under many federal and state 
environmental laws by allowing private plaintiffs to recover fi-
nancially as an incentive for bringing a case that attempts to 
quantify harm to the environment. While the valuation would 
not be “perfect” because of the inherent difficulties in valuing 
environmental harm, it would be akin to the efforts to value 
pain and suffering damages. Courts routinely award these 
damages even though courts recognize that they do not serve to 
“compensate” for the harm and do not value the harm economi-
cally.359 Although we have little ability to value such harm “in 
the market,” we allow juries to place a dollar value on the loss 
to recognize the significant nonmarket injury that has oc-
 
current trends in qui tam actions). 
 356. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000) (providing that private parties can obtain 
between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the recovery or settlement if the 
government decides to proceed with the suit after notice, and between twenty-
five and thirty percent of the recovery or settlement if the government decides 
not to proceed with the suit); see The False Claims Act Legal Center, State 
False Claims Acts, http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) 
(showing states with false claims acts and providing links to the text of such 
laws); see also Petty, supra note 355, at 865–70 (discussing the recovery provi-
sions of state and federal qui tam laws). 
 357. United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 967–68 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(stating the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act exist to deter fraud, 
return funds to the federal treasury, and vindicate the public interest); S. REP. 
NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 (“In the 
face of sophisticated and widespread fraud, the Committee believes only a 
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this 
wave of defrauding public funds.”). 
 358. See infra notes 403–08 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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curred.360 Awards for both pain and suffering and harm to nat-
ural resources are necessary to create a legal system that re-
cognizes that not all harm easily translates into economic 
terms but still attempts to fashion justice with the legal tools 
available.361 Under this framework, there would be no need to 
depart from single-digit ratios in awarding punitive damages 
because there would be a fuller valuation of the harm against 
which to compare punitive damages for ratio purposes. 
Even in the absence of new legislation, courts also have the 
authority to use existing valuation methods to allow enhanced 
punitive damages in private party actions. Three of the cases 
discussed in Section III.B are instructive for other courts ad-
dressing cases involving environmental harm. In Grefer for ex-
ample, there was no assessment of damage to natural resources 
but there were other indicators of total harm.362 In reviewing 
the punitive damages award, the court relied heavily on the es-
timated costs of restoration.363 By doing so, the court at least 
approached a calculation of total harm to natural resources by 
which to compare punitive damages. By using this more com-
plete estimate of actual harm, a single-digit ratio, even at a 2-
to-1 ratio, did not risk undervaluing the harm or creating insuf-
ficient punishment and deterrence. The court allowed the 
plaintiff to recover restoration costs as compensatory damages. 
The court, however, could have refused to award restoration 
costs as too speculative but still used those costs as its total 
harm number in assessing punitive damages. Similarly, the 
court in City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Dow Chem. Co., 
though it determined the city’s estimate for remediating the 
groundwater was unrealistic, could also have used that esti-
 
 360. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text; see also Levit, supra 
note 97, at 179–80 (arguing that allowing recovery for nonpecuniary harm re-
quires courts to be sensitive to the “real nature” of injuries and prevents a 
“hopelessly inauthentic account of humanity” that would endure under a fic-
tion where only physical injuries “actually hurt”); Margaret Jane Radin, Es-
say, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 74 (1993) (award-
ing compensation for pain and suffering allows the justice system to recognize 
a wrong and signify its weightiness even though money “is unrelated to the 
harm suffered”); Dobbins, supra note 97, at 885 (contending that allowing re-
covery of nonuse values as a part of natural resource damages serves to value 
those losses in the same way as recovery for nonmarket pain and suffering 
damages in tort suits). 
 362. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1147–52 (La. Ct. App. 
2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007). 
 363. Id. at 1149–50. 
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mate as the value of harm for purposes of calculating the ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages.364 
The Exxon Valdez case is also consistent with this ap-
proach. Because state and federal governments had already re-
covered for environmental harm in a separate lawsuit, the 
court did not include those amounts in the total harm value for 
evaluating punitive damages.365 Instead, harm for purposes of 
punitive damages consisted solely of actual and potential eco-
nomic harm that resulted from the spill.366 It is clear though, 
that in a case where there had been no separate recovery for 
environmental harm to public resources, such harm should be 
included in the amounts against which punitive damages are 
measured. In this way, courts ensure a fuller valuation of envi-
ronmental harm for purposes of assessing punitive damages 
but avoid any double recovery of either compensatory or puni-
tive damages. 
In cases where valuation information is available to assess 
total harm, there is a stronger argument for remaining within 
single-digit ratios. Courts can recognize the nonmarket injury 
to the environment, even if the plaintiff is not financially in-
jured by the environmental harm, by including it as part of the 
total harm against which punitive damages are measured. 
Such judicial efforts would complement, rather than conflict 
with, existing federal and state citizen suits that federal and 
state statutes permit.367 No new legal framework is necessary 
 
 364. See Nos. 999345, 999643, 2006 WL 2346275, at *11 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 1, 2006); supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
 365. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Alaska 
2004) (discussing the natural resource damage settlement), vacated per cur-
iam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), 
cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 
76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276); John Tomlin, Comment, 
Waking the Sleeping Giant: Analyzing New Jersey’s Pursuit of Natural Re-
source Damages from Responsible Polluting Parties in the Lower Passaic River, 
23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 235, 246–47 (2005–2006) (reporting that the contin-
gent valuation method determined that the damages to natural resources from 
the Exxon Valdez spill were $3 billion, which played a role in Exxon’s agree-
ment to settle those claims). 
 366. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2006) (per cu-
riam), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 
3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. 
Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). 
 367. See supra notes 274, 303 and accompanying text (discussing savings 
clauses in federal environmental statutes and judicial recognition that Con-
gress intended statutory citizen suits and common law actions to supplement 
enforcement of federal environmental laws). 
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to allow consideration of environmental harm in setting puni-
tive damages, and such consideration would serve existing poli-
cy goals of enhancing enforcement of environmental laws as 
well as punishing and deterring environmental wrongdoing.368 
2. Recognizing Unvalued Environmental Harm Where 
Valuation Is Difficult 
In contrast to the prior approach, the alternate approach 
outlined below attempts to use the analysis in the intentional 
tort cases to promote punishment and deterrence objectives in 
environmental harm cases where the court has recognized, 
though not valued, total harm. In these cases, courts should 
permit punitive damage verdicts with high single-digit ratios or 
ratios exceeding single digits. There is some authority already 
for this approach in existing case law. For instance, in the Ex-
xon Valdez case, even though the district court was only va-
luing economic harm from the spill and a significant amount of 
data was available, it remained unable to fully value the harm. 
Even after including all voluntary payments by Exxon in the 
total harm amount, “there was purely non-economic harm that 
[could not] be quantified; there was harm which likely occurred 
but ha[d] not yet been valued; and there was potential harm—
all flowing from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.”369 The 
court relied on this unvalued harm to justify a higher ratio of 
punitive damages, thus following the approach of courts in the 
intentional torts cases.370 While the Ninth Circuit disagreed 
that the ratio should be as high as nearly 10-to-1, it did agree 
that that total harm used to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
punitive damages award should far exceed the compensatory 
damages awarded in the case.371 
The Johansen372 case, discussed supra, also exemplifies an 
attempt to value harm beyond compensatory damages. In that 
case, the court allowed a 100-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages, reasoning that the compensatory dam-
ages did not sufficiently value the harm to the environment and 
that the state had an interest in deterring environmental pollu-
tion.373 The court did not attempt to place a dollar value on the 
 
 368. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
 369. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
 370. Id. at 1104. 
 371. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d at 624. 
 372. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 373. Id. at 1337–38. 
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state’s interest in protecting the environment or the actual en-
vironmental harm.374 Instead, it recognized the presence of the 
invasion of the state’s interest, the existence of the harm, and 
conducted its ratio analysis with that in mind.375 Such an ap-
proach avoids the concerns expressed by the State Farm major-
ity of excessive punitive damages on top of excessive noneco-
nomic damages.376 Here, the court does not award damages for 
noneconomic harm, but the award of punitive damages still 
serves its purposes. 
A court adopting this approach must squarely address the 
Court’s recent decision in Williams.377 In that case, the Court 
limited the ability of the jury to consider harm to “nonparties” 
in awarding punitive damages.378 Thus, Williams calls into 
question a punitive damages award that is based in part on 
unvalued harm to natural resources where those natural re-
sources are not “represented” in the case by a governmental 
entity with standing to seek relief for those damages. For the 
reasons set forth below, however, Williams does not act as a bar 
to courts awarding punitive damages that are enhanced (or not 
reduced) based on unvalued environmental harm. 
First, Williams does not prevent juries from taking into ac-
count harm to nonparties. Instead, it only prevents the jury 
from considering such harm for purposes other than determin-
ing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.379 As a re-
sult, because of the importance of the reprehensibility factor in 
assessing punitive damages, the decision should not pose a bar 
to allowing harm to natural resources to result in higher ratios 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Instead, juries 
can base punitive damages awards in part on unvalued harm to 
natural resources so long as courts carefully instruct juries on 
the limitations of the use of such unvalued harm.380 
Second, and perhaps more important, Williams, like the 
Court’s other punitive damages cases, implicitly assumes that 
 
 374. Id. at 1338–39. 
 375. Id. 
 376. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 
(2003). 
 377. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 378. Id. at 1063–64. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (“Perhaps 
the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”). 
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the harm to “nonparties” can be valued and recovered as com-
pensatory damages (whether economic or noneconomic) by mul-
tiple similarly situated plaintiffs against the same defendant, 
resulting potentially in multiple punitive damages for the same 
wrong.381 The line of cases ending with Williams addressed not 
only cases with large punitive damage verdicts, but also cases 
with large noneconomic compensatory damage verdicts that 
can be recovered by multiple tort victims across the country.382 
The problem in those cases is that there are too many available 
plaintiffs who can seek damages; in the natural resource dam-
age cases, there are often too few.383 Thus, the concerns present 
in Williams do not necessarily exist in environmental harm 
cases. 
Third, environmental harm cases, just like the trespass 
cases, are generally limited to discrete geographic areas and do 
not involve injuries replicated thousands of times throughout 
the state or country.384 Creating confusion on this point is the 
fact that scholars often use the term “environmental torts” 
broadly to describe not only claims for damage to the environ-
ment but also claims for personal injury resulting from expo-
sure to pesticides, asbestos, contaminated soil and groundwa-
ter, and other hazardous products or wastes.385 In fact, scholars 
 
 381. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (“[T]o permit punishment for injuring 
a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive 
damages equation.”). 
 382. Id. at 1060–62 (finding the punitive damages award violated due 
process because the jury instructions allowed the jury to consider harm to 
smokers across the state); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 419–20, 422 (2003) (concluding that the punitive damages award vi-
olated due process because it attempted to punish defendant for its “operations 
throughout the country” which “bore no relation to the [plaintiffs’] harm”); 
BMW, 517 U.S. at 564 (stating that the punitive damages were based, in part, 
on nearly one thousand cars throughout the state that had fraudulently been 
repainted). 
 383. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (discussing limitations 
in federal and state enforcement of environmental laws). 
 384. Even in environmental harm cases involving large corporations such 
as Exxon Mobil and Dow Chemical, the number of potential plaintiffs in a po-
sition to sue based on harm to the physical environment, even with loosened 
standing requirements, is likely to be far less than the number of potential 
plaintiffs in any nationwide consumer fraud or product liability action involv-
ing personal injury or emotional harm. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing 
standing limitations for environmental harm cases). 
 385. See Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a 
National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2005) (“As 
with products liability claims, environmental injury claims hold the potential 
for numerous plaintiffs to allege individual injuries arising out of a single act 
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such as Kip Viscusi have included “environmental torts” in the 
category of cases driving the need for judicial reform of punitive 
damages.386 Based on these calls for reform, one might think 
that the problem of multiple punishments would be a primary 
concern in environmental harm cases. 
A closer look at this claim reveals, however, that these 
scholars are focusing not on private party claims for environ-
mental harm, but on more traditional “toxic tort” claims involv-
ing personal injury.387 Such toxic tort cases raise the same con-
cerns of large, nonpecuniary damages awards present in the 
product liability and nationwide fraud cases that have been the 
topic of significant scholarly attention,388 in addition to a focus 
of the Supreme Court decisions in State Farm and Williams.389 
The environmental toxic tort cases, however, should not be 
so easily classified with the environmental harm cases that are 
the subject of this Article. The environmental harm cases result 
in unvalued harm precisely because there is a significant com-
ponent of the injury (i.e., harm to natural resources) that, un-
like pain and suffering, economic loss, or medical expenses, is 
not personal to or “owned” by the plaintiff. The concern in the 
toxic tort and other personal injury cases is that juries will 
overvalue the damage due to the presence of a sympathetic 
plaintiff and the use of open-ended jury instructions providing 
little guidance in awarding nonpecuniary damages for pain and 
 
or course of conduct on behalf of a single defendant.”); Robert L. Rabin, Envi-
ronmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 27, 30, 39–43 
(1987) (discussing “environmental harms” with reference to toxic tort cases 
involving thousands of victims); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive 
Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 285, 285 (1998) (referring to “environmental” cases to discuss toxic tort 
accidents leading to injury and death). 
 386. See Viscusi, supra note 385, at 285–86 (arguing for the elimination of 
punitive damages for corporate risk and environmental decisions, but relying 
primarily on “environmental” cases involving toxic tort accidents leading to 
personal injury and death); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 19, 64–74 (2002) (basing conclusions on mock jury 
data assessing “products liability and environmental damage torts” although 
the only environmental case studied involved damage solely to public re-
sources and was not brought by a private party). 
 387. See supra note 385. 
 388. See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Puni-
tive Damages and Punishment for Individual Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 583, 583–91 (2003); Denemark, supra note 82, at 931; Gash, supra note 
385, at 1613. 
 389. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003). 
KLASS_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:36 AM 
2007] VALUING HARM 153 
 
suffering, loss of life, and the like.390 In many natural resource 
damages cases, by contrast, there is no plaintiff able to seek 
damages for harm to natural resources and, even when there 
is, the legal system has struggled to develop a system to value 
that damage.391 Thus, it is an error to include the environment-
al harm cases discussed in this Article as merely one type of 
“environmental tort” contributing to the alleged “breakdown” of 
the tort system. 
In sum, the cases involving harm to natural resources are 
significantly different than toxic tort, product liability, and oth-
er cases involving nationwide corporate misconduct that raise 
the specter of a multiplicity of lawsuits with multiple and over-
lapping punitive damages awards.392 Because of these signifi-
cant differences, the concerns raised in State Farm and Wil-
liams simply do not apply. Instead, environmental harm cases, 
like the intentional tort cases, fall within their own discrete 
category of cases that fit the exception to the State Farm single-
digit ratio presumption.393 In the environmental harm cases, 
the unvalued harm is not to “nonparties” who can bring their 
own suits for compensatory and punitive damages, but to public 
natural resources. Even if vindicated by state and federal gov-
ernments, the awards often do not achieve full economic valua-
tion. 
C. APPORTIONING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
HARM CASES 
This Section addresses problems of apportioning the dam-
ages awarded in environmental harm cases filed by a private 
plaintiff attempting to recover punitive damages based not only 
 
 390. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of pre-
cision in jury instructions for awards of pain and suffering and other nonpecu-
niary damages). 
 391. See supra Part III.C (discussing the difficulty of bringing suits for 
natural resource damages and valuing such damages). 
 392. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063–64 (invalidating a punitive damages 
award to the wife of a smoker because of concern that the jury based the puni-
tive damages award on harm to other smokers across the state); State Farm, 
538 U.S. at 419–24 (stating that the punitive damages award was excessive 
because it was based significantly on defendants’ nationwide misconduct with 
regard to processing insurance claims rather than on conduct directed toward 
the plaintiff ). 
 393. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“Our jurisprudence and the prin-
ciples it has now established demonstrate . . . that, in practice, few awards ex-
ceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
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on his or her own economic loss, but also on harm to public re-
sources. In these cases, the plaintiff must establish whether or 
not she will incur some or all of the restoration costs 
representing the total harm inflicted by the defendant. If the 
plaintiff cannot establish she will incur those costs, the plaintiff 
should receive only some portion of the punitive damages, with 
the remainder going to state or nonprofit environmental agen-
cies responsible for the resource. Such apportionment is neces-
sary to address concerns of plaintiff “windfalls” and ensure that 
any punitive damages awarded based on “wrongs” to the public 
go to the public. Despite the minimal precedent for such appor-
tionment in environmental cases, the building blocks exist to 
create a system of apportionment. 
First, Catherine Sharkey has persuasively argued that we 
should recognize that punitive damages contain a compensato-
ry component in addition to the punishment and deterrence 
components.394 According to Sharkey, these “compensatory so-
cietal damages” are a significant, but insufficiently acknowl-
edged, aspect of punitive damages that serve the goal of re-
dressing the harms caused by defendants beyond the individual 
plaintiffs in any particular case.395 Sharkey focuses primarily 
on single tortious acts by defendants that harm multiple vic-
tims and on torts which consist of repeated conduct affecting 
multiple parties.396 In both types of cases, she suggests various 
mechanisms to distribute a portion of punitive damages “not 
only to the plaintiff but also to the society of similarly harmed 
individuals.”397 These mechanisms include variations on puni-
tive damages class actions,398 refinements to split-recovery  
statutes,399 and judicial allocation of some portion of punitive 
damages awards to state coffers in the absence of legislation.400 
The judicial analysis in the intentional tort and environ-
mental harm cases discussed in earlier Parts is consistent with 
 
 394. See Sharkey, supra note 31, at 350–52, 389–414. 
 395. Id. at 351–52. 
 396. Id. at 389. 
 397. Id. at 390. 
 398. Id. at 410–14. 
 399. Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah 
all have statutes that require some percentage of punitive damages awards in 
all or certain classes of cases to be paid to the state or an agency within the 
state. Id. at 373, 375–80. 
 400. Id. at 380–86, 402–15 (discussing the judicial apportionment of puni-
tive damages between the plaintiff and the state in the absence of controlling 
legislation). 
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Sharkey’s concept of compensatory societal damages. Through-
out these cases, courts continually refer to the need for signifi-
cant punitive awards to not only punish and deter defendants, 
but to somehow compensate or value harm to society and to 
protect individual rights and resources.401 Each of these cases 
focuses on the state’s interest in the private dispute before the 
court either in terms of protecting natural resources, deterring 
similar wrongful conduct in the future, or both.402 It is not a 
significant leap, however, to conceive of the state’s interest as a 
compensatory one as well. At least in the environmental harm 
cases, where the injury is to public resources, an award of puni-
tive damages can, in addition to serving its traditional punitive 
and deterrent purposes, serve to compensate the state for the 
defendant’s violation of its interest. More tailored legislative 
and judicial efforts to implement split-recovery of punitive 
damages seem particularly applicable in these cases, where an 
individual plaintiff lawsuit raises larger issues of harm to pub-
lic environmental resources. 
Building on this idea, several states have split-recovery 
statutes where a certain percentage of punitive damages 
awarded in all or certain classes of cases are paid to state 
funds.403 Seven of the eight states with such statutes impose 
split-recovery in all cases; whereas Georgia permits split-
recovery only in product liability cases.404 Alaska, Missouri, 
and Utah require 50% of the punitive damages award to go to a 
 
 401. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1338 (11th Cir. 
1999) (allowing a ratio larger than single digits and focusing on the state’s in-
terest in deterring environmental pollution); Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 
So. 2d 1117, 1137–38 (La. Ct. App. 2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007) (reviewing remediation estimates with refer-
ence to the state’s interest in cleaning up the property and serving as a trustee 
for public natural resources); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 
154, 160–61 (Wis. 1997) (focusing on society’s interest in preserving the integr-
ity of the legal system and protecting the interests of individual landowners in 
awarding punitive damages). 
 402. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1333, 1338–39; Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1137–38; 
Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160–61. 
 403. See supra note 399. 
 404. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 377–78 (noting that Alaska, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, Utah, Oregon, and Illinois permit split-recovery in all cases and cit-
ing and quoting the relevant state statutes). In addition, since 2003, six states 
have proposed legislation that would deny plaintiffs any portion of punitive 
damages awards, although no state has yet enacted such legislation. See 
Kelly-Rose Garrity, Note, Whose Award Is It Anyway?: Implications of Award-
ing the Entire Sum of Punitive Damages to the State, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 395, 
395–96, 403 (2006). 
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state fund; Oregon requires 60%; Georgia, Indiana, and Iowa 
require 75%; and Illinois leaves the percentage to the discretion 
of the trial court.405 In some states these amounts are deposited 
in the general fund, while in others legislation directs that the 
money go to civil reparations funds, criminal reparation funds, 
and the like.406 
Currently, none of these statutes apply specifically to cases 
involving environmental harm. It would not be difficult, howev-
er, to amend these statutes or create others to ensure that a 
portion of the punitive damages award in a private party envi-
ronmental harm case goes to the state department of natural 
resources or a pollution control agency where appropriate. In a 
case where restoration costs make up a portion of compensatory 
damages, like in Grefer, punitive damages based on that 
amount should go to the state unless it is clear the private 
plaintiff will be incurring those costs. Likewise, if damage to 
natural resources is recognized in order to allow a ratio of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages above single digits, but 
that damage is not monetized like in Johansen, the court 
should award the amount of punitive damages exceeding a sin-
gle-digit ratio to the state unless the plaintiff takes responsibil-
ity for restoring the natural resources. In each of these cases, 
the legislation should ensure that the plaintiff receives com-
pensatory damages, punitive damages based on the plaintiff ’s 
actual losses (economic loss and restoration costs incurred), a 
full recovery of attorney’s fees,407 and some additional percen-
tage of the punitive damages based on harm to public re-
sources. 
Allowing private plaintiffs to receive a percentage of the 
“public” punitive damages is necessary to ensure that plaintiffs 
have sufficient incentives to pursue claims that involve not only 
private out-of-pocket losses, but also harm to public natural re-
sources. The qui tam laws discussed earlier serve as precedent 
for allowing private plaintiffs to bring suit on behalf of federal 
or state governments and retain a portion of the proceeds.408 
 
 405. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 377–78. 
 406. Id. at 379–80. 
 407. Existing split-recovery legislation in some states already ensures that 
the state does not receive its percentage of recovery until after the plaintiff ’s 
attorneys fees are recovered from the total award. Id. at 378–79 (stating that 
in most, but not all, states with split-recovery statutes, the percentage allo-
cated to the state is calculated after all applicable costs and fees, including the 
plaintiff ’s full contingency fee, are recovered by the plaintiff ). 
 408. See supra notes 355–57 and accompanying text. 
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This incentive allows private parties to act on behalf of the en-
vironment and thus aid federal and state enforcement efforts. 
This type of “split” could be available not only pursuant to 
legislation but also through the courts’ inherent common law 
authority.409 Sharkey details examples where courts have en-
gaged in judicial split-recovery remedies in the absence of ap-
plicable legislation.410 Courts have directed some portion of pu-
nitive damages to specific state or nonprofit funds to mitigate 
plaintiff windfalls, as well as to promote societal interests the 
defendants violated.411 While critics may charge that such ac-
tions constitute inappropriate judicial activism, significant 
support exists in legal theory and case law for courts’ use of 
their common law authority to shape legal remedies in the ab-
sence of statutes to the contrary.412 As a result, courts can di-
rect some portion of punitive damages awards to state or non-
profit funds for environmental restoration or protection when it 
is clear that some of the harm, whether valued or not, is to pub-
lic natural resources. 
Notably, there are anecdotes, though not empirical data, of 
juries who questioned whether they had authority to impose a 
split-recovery scheme in environmental cases. In Grefer, for ex-
ample, the jury foreperson sent a note to the trial court during 
deliberations inquiring whether any of the punitive damages 
award would “go to compensate the people in the communi-
ty.”413 Likewise, in a 2002 trial involving environmental con-
tamination and punitive damages in Minnesota, the jury fore-
person sent a note to the trial court as follows: 
Your Honor, for clarification purposes, would you please explain to us 
“punitive damages.” Do we as a jury get to decide where and how the 
funds are distributed? Meaning, can we specify that these funds must 
be used to clean up this property? Or go to the [Minnesota Pollution 
 
 409. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 380–86. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976, 1009 (D. Kan. 1984) (affirming 
an award of $10 million in punitive damages to the plaintiff based on the de-
fendant’s intentional acts of pollution, but holding the award in abeyance con-
tingent upon the defendant’s agreement to undertake cleanup efforts); Shar-
key, supra note 31, at 380–86 (citing Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 121–22, 144–46 (Ohio 2002) (remitting a $49 million 
punitive damages award in a bad faith insurance claim case to $10 million and 
awarding two-thirds of that amount, after attorneys fees, to a cancer research 
fund)). 
 412. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 302, at 570; Sharkey, supra note 31, at 424. 
 413. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1150 n.26 (La. Ct. App. 
2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007). 
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Control Agency] to clean up the property, or do they go to [the plain-
tiff ] to use as they see fit (do they pocket the money)?414 
In both these cases, the answer to the jury was that the 
plaintiff, not the state or the community, would receive the full 
amount of punitive damages.415 But was that the only possible 
answer? I argue that it was not. Courts and legislatures can 
implement split-recovery of punitive damages in order to allow 
optimal punishment and deterrence of defendants without re-
sulting in plaintiff windfalls. 
Indeed, in the absence of judicial or legislative implemen-
tation of split-recovery, there is evidence that juries will at-
tempt to “do justice” using whatever tools they are given. Em-
pirical studies have shown that mock jurors will inflate their 
compensatory damages awards if they are denied the opportu-
nity to award punitive damages or if caps are placed on puni-
tive damages.416 In this way, jurors “use compensatory judg-
ments to seek retribution or promote specific deterrence or 
general deterrence.”417 Because of the serious harm to public 
natural resources in many environmental cases involving puni-
tive damages, such cases run a significant risk of jurors conflat-
ing compensatory and punitive damages if the punitive damag-
es can only be based on the economic loss of the private 
plaintiff. 
Legislative and judicial action to implement split-recovery 
of punitive damages in environmental harm cases thus will 
 
 414. Transcript of Proceedings at 2–3, Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, 
2006 WL 305279 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2002) (No. 99-CV-1833 JMR/FLN). 
 415. Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1150 n.26; Transcript of Proceedings at 2–3, 
Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., 2006 WL 305279 (No. 99-CV-1833 JMR/FLN). 
 416. Sharkey & Klick, supra note 82, at 1–2 (discussing findings that the 
adoption of punitive damage caps leads to statistically significant increases in 
compensatory damages awards and citing studies showing similar inflation of 
compensatory awards where mock jurors were prohibited from awarding puni-
tive damages); see Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 447 (Wis. 1980) 
(“[I]f punitive damages are not allowed, juries [will] give vent to their desire to 
punish the wrongdoer under the guise of increasing the compensatory damag-
es, particularly those awarded for pain and suffering.” (citing 2 FOWLER V. 
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1300 (1956))). 
 417. Sharkey & Klick, supra note 82, at 3 (quoting Michelle Chernikoff An-
derson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compen-
satory and Punitive Damages, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 315 (1999)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Catherine Sharkey, Crossing the Punitive-
Compensatory Divide, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., forthcoming Nov. 
2007) (discussing how juries use compensatory damages to punish defendants 
when caps are placed on punitive damages). 
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serve multiple, positive goals. First, it will ensure that the pu-
nitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages are fully 
implemented by basing the punitive damages award on the to-
tal harm, whether incurred by the private plaintiff or the pub-
lic.418 Second, it will provide some measure of compensation to 
the absent public plaintiff who, for lack of resources, politics, or 
other reasons is not present as a plaintiff to protect the natural 
resources in question. Third, it will provide additional incen-
tives for plaintiffs to bring suits to protect environmental re-
sources, in addition to recovering their related private losses. If 
plaintiffs know that they can obtain attorneys fees, out-of-
pocket losses, as well as a portion of the “public” punitive dam-
ages, potential plaintiffs will have sufficient incentive to bring 
suit and thus act as private attorneys general without the cor-
responding public concern of inappropriate windfall awards. 
Last, it will encourage courts and juries to impose punitive 
damages based on a reprehensibility analysis that includes “to-
tal” harm, rather than merely the plaintiff ’s compensatory 
damages.419 
Finally, this more nuanced approach to punitive damages 
will further illuminate the fact that a unitary approach to puni-
tive damage assessments is inappropriate. As shown in Part II, 
the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence centers around the 
fear of excessive nonpecuniary damages and excessive total 
awards in products liability cases and other cases involving na-
tionwide harm. These concerns have little place in most envi-
ronmental harm cases, where uncertainties in valuation more 
often result in undervaluation of harm rather than excessive 
damages. If courts more fully recognize harm that is difficult to 
value and address this issue explicitly, they will properly use 
the flexibility the Supreme Court created in BMW and State 
Farm in their review of jury awards for punitive damages in 
cases involving environmental harm. 
  CONCLUSION   
The jurisprudence of punitive damages has been signifi-
cantly transformed in little more than a decade. Where puni-
tive damages were once almost exclusively the province of jur-
 
 418. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text (discussing recognized 
purposes of punitive damages). 
 419. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007) 
(allowing harm to the public and nonparties to be considered as part of the re-
prehensibility guidepost of punitive damages). 
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ies and state courts, the Supreme Court’s involvement in this 
area has now brought punitive damages awards under exacting 
federal constitutional due process review. Throughout the Su-
preme Court’s journey in this area, judicial and public attention 
has focused on the billion-dollar punitive damages awards 
against large corporations arising from nationwide conduct, or 
punitive awards based on large, nonpecuniary compensatory 
damages awards. This focus has resulted in insufficient atten-
tion to cases in which harm to individual rights, public rights, 
or public resources remains partially or wholly unvalued. This 
Article attempts to shed light on these latter cases through the 
study of intentional tort and environmental harm cases and 
provides the beginnings of a framework for correcting the un-
dervaluation of environmental harm. If courts can attempt to 
value or at least acknowledge harm that a compensatory dam-
ages award does not currently measure, they can better imple-
ment the Supreme Court’s due process objectives, while still re-
taining the effectiveness of punitive damages in deterring and 
punishing wrongful conduct. 
